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Abstract: I analyse a marriage market with transferable utility when the output 
of two matched agents is a decreasing function of the di¤erence in their types i.e. 
like attracts like. The pattern of sorting and payo¤s exhibit many features not found 
in the standard model, where more is always better. Full positive sorting occurs 
not only if the output function is concave (equivalent to supermodularity) but also 
if the distribution of types is the same on each side of the market, regardless of 
the technology. Convexity of the output function is not in general equivalent to 
submodularity and negative sorting occurs only if there is no overlap in the two type 
distributions; otherwise there is a mix of perfect matching and negative sorting. For 
both sides of the market, payo¤s as a function of type tend to display a wavelike 
pattern and are only weakly connected to the quality of the match an agent is in. At 
types where one payo¤ function is increasing, the other is decreasing. With convexity, 
we have maximum possible matching of like with exactly like, so for agents on the 
long side of the market their optimal choice of partner is not unique. Even though like 
is attracted to like, having a type close to the mean type on the other side does not 
always imply a high payo¤, and when the marriage market is embedded in a wider 
economy providing outside options such agents may well remain single.
Keywords: Matching; sorting; marriage market; horizontal heterogeneity; homophily; 
transferable utility.
JEL Classification Number: C7
This paper is a complete re-working of Clark (2007), which assumes non-transferable 
utility. I am grateful to many people for their advice and suggestions during the 
preparation of this paper, in particular Mike Elsby, John Moore, Jozsef Sakovics, and 
Andreas Steinhauer. Any errors are entirely mine.
1 Introduction
This paper examines a class of matching problems when agents on one side of the market are
attracted to agents on the other side with similar characteristics; i.e. like attracts like. With such
preferences, agents from one side will typically di¤er in how they rank potential partners from
the other side, in contrast to the case where agents may di¤er in their own characteristics but
nevertheless agree on how potential parters should be ranked; i.e. more is always better.
There are many situations where it is useful to think of agents as preferring to match with
someone who is similar to them, or who ts in with their own objectives or capabilities; such
preferences are sometimes called homophilic.1 A person in search of a partner might prefer
someone of the same age, or who has similar tastes or political views, or comes from a similar
cultural, social, or ethnic background.2 Potential adopters may prefer a child of their own race,
and adoption agencies may prefer to place a child in a family of the same race.3 Moving beyond
the personal, employers may prefer, and be preferred by, workers who share their goals or sense
of mission.4 Doctors may di¤er on the right way to treat patients, and patients may di¤er on
how they want to be treated.5 The assignment of interns to hospitals has long been an important
application of matching theory; e.g. Roth (1984). A hospital specialising in new cancer treatments
may prefer an academically oriented applicant who has done well in oncology, whereas the hospital
with a busy Emergency Room would prefer someone with practical skills who can work under
pressure. A student might prefer a college where the courses are pitched at a level suitable to her
ability; and the college might prefer a less able student because it has a mission, and the funding,
to educate the less gifted, not just the cleverest. A research oriented university might prefer, and
be preferred by, a scholar dedicated to research who sees teaching as a necessary chore, whereas
a university whose income depends mostly on teaching may prefer a brilliant teacher to the star
researcher.
The possibility that similar agents attracted to each other will actually match with each
other has welfare and policy implications which go beyond the usual considerations of e¢ ciency
1 Interpreted literally, homophily means love of the same, and in this spirit I take it as a way to describe agents
tastes. In theoretical biology such preferences are sometimes labelled homotypic; for example, Alpern and Reyniers
(1999). Fu et al, (2012) dene homophily as the tendency to interact (not just to mate) with others of similar type.
Buccara and Yariv (2013) and Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2009), in their anaysis of peer and friendship groups,
also take homophily to be the association between similar people. I analyse a marriage market, and use the term
homogamy when like actually matches with lilke.
2The literature on the determinants of personal attraction is enormous, so what follows is necessarily selective.
On preferences for similarity (or not) of age see Lam (1988), Bergstrom and Lam (1991), Hayes (1995), Dalmia
and Sicilian (2008); Eika, Mogstad, and Zafar (2019), Hitsch, Hortescu, and Ariely (2010), Ciscato, Galichon, and
Gousse (2019), Sautman (2017). For similarity of culture and ethnic background see Rivera (2012), Currarini,
Jackson, and Pini (2010), Boucher (2015), Boyd et al. (2003), Hitsch, Hortescu, and Ariely (2010), Fisman et al.
(2008). For similarity of eld-of-study amongst college graduates, see Bicakova and Jurajda (2016). For similarity
of weight see Schafer and Keith (1990). For similarity of tastes for jointly consumed goods, see Clark and Kanbur
(2004). For similarity of a range of personal traits see Buss and Barnes (1986) and for attraction to partners with
similar a¤ective disorders and other psychiatric traits see Mathews and Reus (2001). For similarity of religion
see Carvalho (2016). For similarity of social rank see Goni (2018), Marcassa, Pouyet, and Trégouët (2019). On
political similarity, see Huber and Malhotra (2017).
3See Baccara et al. (2010),
4For example, Besley and Ghatak (2005) analyse a model of organisational goals and workersmotivation in
which principals would most prefer to employ (and are most preferred by) agents who share their ideals.
5Type of medical treatment is explicitly seen as a matching issue in Phelps (2000) and in Fabbri and Monfardini
(2006)s analysis of childbirth.
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and the maximisation of total output. If attraction is based on similarity of tastes for music,
for example, then there is no great social harm done if lovers of classical music match among
themelves and not with a¢ cianados of jazz. But if attraction is based on social position this
raises the possibility of persistent social stratication. Attraction and sorting based on similarity
of education provides a possible mechanism for the inheritance of social and economic advantage
and the persistence of inequality, a point pursued by many authors (although mainly in a setting
of more is better).6 Racial preferences, whether for spouses, friends, adoptive children, employees,
or in the assignment of teachers to schools, is clearly one avenue that might explain persistent
racial inequality and segregation.
But although like may be attracted to like, this is no guarantee that like will actually be
matched with like: homophily does not automatically imply homogamy. The route from pref-
erences to outcomes depends on many factors, and indeed is the central question of matching
theory. With fully transferable utility (TU), regardless of the distribution of types matching will
display positive assortative matching (PAM) if the combined output or surplus of two matched
agents is a supermodular function of their characteristics. In the case of homophilic preferences,
supermodularity arises if the output q of a matched couple is a concave function of the di¤erence
in their types x and y;7 for example q =    jx   yj2. But even with PAM, whether couples
are well matched will depend on the distribution of types. In the absence of supermodularity,
matters are much more complicated, as the notion of submodularity generally makes little sense
when like attracts like. For example, the function   jx  yj0:5 is only submodular if x  y does
not change sign, in which case matching will display negative assortative matching (NAM). This
is clearly very restrictive as it rules out pairs of type distributions (one for men, one for women)
whose supports overlap.
Just as the pattern of matching is driven by factors many of which play no role in the standard
model, so too agentspayo¤s exhibit features not found when more is better. For example, with
homophilic preferences, there is no reason for higher types (in the sense of a greater value of x
or y) to receive a higher payo¤. A high type female may be so di¤erent from all men that she
can nd a match only if she gets a small share of any joint output. This might suggest that the
women most in demand (and thus with the highest payo¤s) will be those with types close to the
mass of male types. But as we shall see, this is not always the case: it is possible that women
with types at or near the mean of the male type distribution have lower payo¤s than all other
women.
1.1 A simple example
To illustrate some of these issues, we suppose men and women are characterised only by height.
If a man of height x is matched with a woman of height y; they produce output q =   jx  yj
where  > 0; he gets utility u = q=2    and she gets v = q=2 + , where  is a payment or
6For example Chiappori, Salanie, and Weiss. (2017), Ciscato, Galichon, Gousse (2019), Eika, Mogstad, and Zafar
(2014), Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2002), Fernandez (2002), Kremer (1997), Olivetti, Paserman, and Salisbury
(2018).
7 In the language of the optimal transport literature, this is a case of convex costs. See Villani (2003, 2009) and
Galichon (2016).
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transfer, possibly negative, from him to her. Unmatched agents receive utility su¢ ciently low to
ensure that everyone will be matched in equilibrium.
Figure 1 illustrates an important property of the relationship between types and output. If
 > 1, q is a concave function of the absolute type di¤erence jx   yj; we can also regard it as a
concave function of the signed di¤erence x   y; and hence as a supermodular function of x and
y: If  < 1; q is concave function of jx  yj but not of x  y; and is not, in general, a submodular
function of x and y: @q=@x is negative and decreasing in y for y < x; and positive and decreasing
in y for y > x:
Figure 1: the relationship between q and x  y when q =   jx  yj
We start with two women, Hillary and Melania, with heights (in centimeters) of 180 and 191
respectively, and two men, Donald and Bill, with heights 189 and 200; see Figure 2. We label
this population P1:
Figure 2: the population P1
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Consider rst the case where  = 2. Total output is maximised by PAM, Hillary matching
with Donald and Melania with Bill, so that (in obvious notation) vH + uD = vM + uB =   81.
The payo¤s (and hence transfers) that sustain the PAM outcome are not unique. The requirement
to prevent blocking pairs from forming implies vH + uB     400 and vM + uD     4; and
if we narrow down the set of equilibria by exploiting the symmetry of the two distributions and
impose vH = uB and vM = uD (so that neither gender is exogenously advantaged) then
=2  200  vH = uB  =2  79
=2  2  vM = uD  =2 + 119
This shows very starkly the importance for Hillarys payo¤ of the position of her type not just in
the distribution of womens types but also relative to the distribution of male types. She is the
shorter person of the shorter sex and the alternative to an imperfect match with Donald is a bad
match with Bill. But for Melania the alternative to Bill is a good match with Donald. Thus the
taller woman gets the higher payo¤. Similarly, Bill is the taller person of the taller sex, giving
him as weak a position as Hillarys, and a lower payo¤ than Donald.
Suppose now  = 1=2: Total output is maximised by NAM, Hillary matching with Bill and
Melania with Donald, so that vH + uB =    201=2 and vM + uD =    21=2. Again imposing
gender equality, we immediately have
vH = uB = =2  51=2
vM = uD = =2  2 1=2
As vH +uD = vM +uB >  3; these payo¤s prevent the formation of blocking pairs and sustain
NAM as an equilibrium. Again, Melania and Donald get the higher payo¤s, despite the reversal
of the matching pattern.
Note that with the types as given, PAM will generate greater total output than NAM if 
> ; where   0:569 solves 20 + 2 = 9 + 9: But if we change the types distribution so
that all women are shorter than all men (e.g. by swapping the heights of Melania and Donald)
then NAM dominates PAM if and only if  < 1.
1.1.1 A symmetric population
Consider now a di¤erent population, P2; of men Nicolas and Emmanuel, with heights 158 and 169,
and women Brigitte and Carla, with heights 167 and 178. P2 is a mirror image of P1, reected
around 179, so any equilibrium of P1 is an equilibrium of P2; mutatis mutandis. If  = 2, we have
PAM, Nicolas matched Brigitte, and Emmanuel with Carla, with uN + vB = uE + vC =    81
and imposing gender equality:
=2  200  uN = vC  =2  79
=2  2  uE = vB  =2 + 119
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Similarly if  = 1=2 we have NAM and
uN = vC = =2  51=2
uE = vB = =2  2 1=2
For both values of ; it is now the shorter female and the taller male who get the higher payo¤s.
1.1.2 A larger population
Merging P1 and P2 gives a population P3, illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: the population P3
It can readily be computed that no output maximising matching of P3 can have anyone from
P1 paired with anyone from P2, whatever the technology; thus the equilibrium matching of P3
combines those of P1 and P2. However, Nicolass payo¤, for example, need not be same as Bills.
We therefore narrow down the set of equilibrium payo¤s by imposing a natural symmetry: that
the common payo¤ of the shorter person of the shorter sex and the the taller person of the taller
sex is the same in P1 (Nicolas and Carla) as in P2 (Hillary and Bill).8 Thus if  = 2,
=2  200  uN = vC = vH = uB  =2  79 (1)
=2  2  uE = vB = vM = uD  =2 + 119 (2)
8This implies that the common payo¤ of the shorter person of the taller sex and the the taller person of the
shorter sex is the same in P1 (Brigitte and Emmanuel) as in P2 (Donald and Melania),
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where uN + vB = uE + vC = vH + uD = vM + uB =   81. If  = 1=2
uN = vC = vH = uB = =2  51=2 (3)
uE = vB = vM = uD = =2  2 1=2 (4)
In each case, the merging of P1 and P2 imposes no further constraints, as payo¤s satisfying (1)
and (2), or (3) and (4), also imply no-one in P1 would prefer to match with anyone in P2; and
vice versa.
Figure 4: payo¤s of the population P3
left scale,  = 0:5; right scale,  = 2
Figure 4 shows payo¤s as a function of type when  = 0:5 and  = 2; for the latter, we show
the mid-point of the range of indeterminacy. In both cases, it illustrates several features that
do not arise in the conventional model of more is better : (i) neither u nor v is monotonic; (ii) u
and v move in opposite directions: u is increasing then decreasing whereas v is decreasing then
increasing; (iii) if a man of height x is matched with a woman of type y, then u at x changes in
the opposite way to v at y:
There is an additional phenomenon, which is at rst counter-intuitive. Carla and Hillary
have types in the middle of the male type distribution, so one might expect them to be in high
demand; yet among the women they receive the lowest payo¤s. As we shall see, this is not a
peculiarity of this numerical example but quite generic and survives the extension to a more
complete model. The explanation is that as women have the less dispersed distribution, there are
more women than men with types at or around the common mean. In equilibrium this is resolved
by a lower payo¤ for such women, and a higher payo¤ for Emmanuel and Donald. Similarly, the
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men at the extremes of the male distribution, Nicolas and Bill, nd it di¢ cult to secure a close
match, and have low payo¤s, whereas Brigitte and Melania have heights that ll a particular
niche, and have high payo¤s. If we were to introduce an outside option, either for men or for
women, that induced some married agents to leave the marriage market, these agents would be
those with lower payo¤s: the women in the middle of the type distribution and the men at the
extremes.
As Figure 4 shows, the features described above are independent of the modularity or other-
wise of the output function. But the technology matters in one important respect. For simplicity,
we return to the population P1. We now add one woman, Angela, and one man, Justin, both
of height 185. When  = 2; PAM now means that Hillary is matched with Justin, Angela with
Donald, and (as before) Melania with Bill. Angela and Justin, even though they are perfectly
suited to each other, do not match in equilibrium. But if  = 1=2; it straightforward to show that
Angela matches with Justin. This is quite general: when the output function is convex and a type
t man matches with a type y woman, and at the same time a type t woman matches with a type
x man (where t 6= x; t 6= y), the foursome could repartner, the t types together and the x type
with the y type, and increase total output.9 With convexity there will therefore be maximum
matching of like with exactly like e.g. Angela and Justin. As I show, this has important impli-
cations for computing and characterising the overall matching, which is typically neither PAM
nor NAM. For now, we note that in large populations it also means that at types where there
are (for example) more men than women the men must be indi¤erent between choosing to match
with women of the same type (so that we have maximum matching of like with exactly like)
and women of some other type, possibly quite di¤erent (so that the excess men nd a partner).
Typically there will be many types either where men or women are relatively abundant. It is
thus a generic feature of the convex case that for many agents (in the formal model a positive
mass) their optimal choice is not unique; this is a signicant departure from the standard case
of more is always better, where supermodularity or submodularity give rise to PAM or NAM
respectively and the equilibrium matching is characterised by a monotonic relationship between
male and female types.
This result illustrates how tastes and technology interact to generate an e¢ cient matching.
Homophily naturally tends to bring similar agents together; but unless the type distributions are
identical, there must be some imperfect matches. Concavity of the output function, via Jensens
inequality, smooths out the type gaps between matched agents, avoiding a mix of very good
and very bad matches in favour of moderate gaps. With convexity, Jensens inequality works
the other way round: we have as many perfect matches as possible, with some of the remaining
agents possibly very badly matched.
9 If g is the output function then
g(0) + g(jx  yj) > g(jt  xj) + g(jt  yj)
which follows from g0 < 0 (if t is either less or greater than both x and y) or from g00 > 0 (if t is between x and y).
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1.2 Related theoretical literature
Although this paper looks at homophily in marriage markets, where matching is one-to-one, there
is a considerable literature which look at homophily in other settings, particularly networks of
people of similar beliefs, values, or attitudes; see, for example, Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2009),
Bramoullé et al (2012), Baccara and Yariv (2013), the survey in Jackson (2014), and Currarini
and Mengel (2016). The main aim of these papers is to explain and characterise networks as a
result of homophilic preferences (which we also assume) and bias in meeting opportunities (which
we do not). Recent work by Kets and Sandroni (2019) has sought to explain the tendency to
associate with similar people not as a result of innate homophilic preferences, but as a way to
reduce uncertainty about othersactions: agents nd it easier to empathise with similar types
and hence to predict their behaviour. Intriguingly, agents may form homophilic connections even
if this is at the cost of not satisfying non-homophilic preferences.
In addition to the many applied papers on homophily and matching in marriage markets,
both in economics and other subjects, there is an important theoretical literature with origins
largely outside Economics. The problem of optimal transportationwas posed by Monge (1781)
in the context of minimising the costs of transferring iron ore from mines to factories: if we seek
a one-to-one matching of mines and factories and transportation is costly, what is the optimal
matching? The parallel with seeking a matching of men and women that minimises the di¤erences
between them is obvious. Kantorovich formalised this as a programming problem, and developed
and applied to it the powerful tools of duality theory; in particular, he showed how prices can
support the optimal outcome as a decentralised equilibrium (for example, see Kantorovich (2006),
a translation of a 1944 paper). Many applications and further topics in the mathematics of optimal
transportation can be found in Villani (2003) and Villani (2009). The monographs by Galichon
(2016) and Chiappori (2017) illustrate how fruitful this approach is in analysing a wide range of
economic situations, and in particular to showing how optimal transport methods complement
and extend the pioneering work of Becker (1973) in analysing matching and sorting.
Most economic applications have not been in a framework of minimising the cost of di¤erences
between matched agents but rather in one where more is always better. In many applications,
this may be the more suitable assumption e.g. where two inputs both have positive marginal
products, However, that is not always the case, as shown by the range of applications where
like attracts like is more appropriate. There has been a small number of theoretical papers that
assume the output of two matched agents is decreasing in some measure of the di¤erence betwen
them. Clark (2007) has a set-up similar to that considered here, but assumes non-transferable
utility and provides no analysis of payo¤s. Klumpp (2009) models spatially di¤erentiated agents
but allows trade only in one direction (i.e. buyers and sellers are on opposite sides of a one-
way street, but trade only occurs if the seller is to the left of the buyer). Hofmann and Qari
(2010) analyse a model of search and matching, but they only consider non-transferable utility,
and agents in their model have types uniformly distributed on a circle. The model presented in
this paper has types distributed on the real line, and allows trade in both directions (e.g. tall
men may match with short women, and tall women with short men). Furthermore, in assuming
transferable utility we are able to take full advantage of the duality results of Kantorovich, Villani,
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and Galichon; in particular we show how payo¤ functions can display unexpected properties.
1.3 Plan of the paper
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, I set up a formal model
of frictionless matching with transferable utility, with a restriction on the surplus generating
technology that embodies homophily. I derive a number of properties of the payo¤ functions
that are independent of any further assumptions about the technology. In Section 3, I analyse
matching and payo¤s when output is a decreasing and concave function of the type di¤erence
between matched agents, equivalent to supermodularity. Section 4 looks at the case when the
output function is decreasing but convex. This case is not equivalent to submodularity, and
poses a range of analytical challenges. Nevertheless, the matching pattern is shown to obey
certain principles, in particular a Two Type Property, whereby some agents can achieve their
equilibrium payo¤ by choosing a partner of their own type or of some other type. Section 5 looks
at the payo¤ functions in more detail; in so far as they are wavelike, I analyse what determines
their amplitide and frequency. Section 6 extends the model to allow for unmatched agents to
have an outside option. We are then able to show who remains single and which are married.
Section 7 concludes. Throughout, I illustrate the analysis with variations on a small number of
simple numerical examples. Proofs are kept to an Appendix.
2 The Model
Agents are characterised by gender and type. An agents type is a real number in the interval
T = [t; t]. Integrable functions  : T ! R and  : T ! R give the density of types amongst
men and women respectively, with interval supports T and T and distribution functions  and
 , where T [ T = T: There is an equal mass 
 of men and women, so that (t) =  (t) = 
.
If a man of type x is matched with a woman of type y they produce an output f(x; y); where
f : T T ! R; and get utility f(x; y)=2  and f(x; y)=2 + respectively where  is a payment,
possibly negative, from him to her; an unmatched agent gets zero utility. To capture the idea
that like attracts like, I assume
Assumption 1: f(x; y) = g(jx  yj) for some twice di¤erentiable function g with domain
[0; t  t] such that
0 < g(jx  yj) for jx  yj 2 [0; t  t] (5)
g0(jx  yj) < 0 if x 6= y: (6)
Thus fx(x; y) =  fy(x; y) if either x 6= y or x = y and g0(0) = 0: Note that, as in the special
case illustrated in Figure 1, if g is concave then f is supermodular, but if g is convex, f is not
generally submodular. However, if the supports of  and  do not overlap, x  y does not change
sign, so if g is convex, fxy =  g00(jx   yj) < 0 for all (x; y) 2 T  T ; f is then e¤ectively
submodular. For simplicity, from now on we write g(jx  yj) as g(x  y); it being understood that
g admits only a non-negative argument.
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A matching describes what types of men are matched with what types of women, and is a
measure on T 2 with marginals  and .10 For example, given a matching ; (A  B) denotes
the mass of matched pairs such that the mans type is in A and the womans is in B. Similarly,
if D is the 45o line in T  T , (D) measures the extent of homogamy (like matched with exactly
like): Then f is a measurable function, and the total output from a matching  is Q =
R
TT fd:
Partitions of T In determining the matching pattern and payo¤ functions, a key role is played
by the intersections of the density functions  and ; and of the distribution functions  and  .
To rule out trivial cases where the density functions di¤er at a set of points of measure zero, and
pathological cases involving an innite number of intersections, I assume:
Assumption 2: If  6=  then for some nite number n > 1 the interval T has a partition
(t; t1; :::; tn 1; t);with n subintervals Ti = [ti 1; ti] where t0 = t and tn = t; such that for i = 1; :::; n
either (t) > (t) for all t 2 int(Ti); (then Ti is a -interval)
or (t) < (t) for all t 2 int(Ti); (then Ti is a -interval)
and no two adjacent intervals are of the same type.
Note that, given  and ; if two partitions both satisfy Assumption 1, they must be the
same:11 The intervals of this unique partition have a natural ordering, expressed as Ti < Tj for
i < j: Assumption 2 has immediate implications for the intersections of  and   :
Lemma 1 If  6= ; then  6=   and the interval T has a unique partition
(t; s1; :::; sm 1; t); with m subintervals Si = [si 1; si] where s0 = t and sm = t such
that
(i) (si) =  (si) for i = 0; 1; :::;m;
(ii) either (t) >  (t) for all t 2 int(Si (then Si is a -interval)
or  (t) > (t) for all t 2 int(Si) (then Si is a  -interval)
(iii) m < n:
2.1 Equilibrium with TU
The powerful duality results that follow from the framework above have been widely exploited in
the matching literature. For a recent exposition, see Galichon (2016), in particular Proposition
2.3 and Theorem 7.6.12 The key feature is that a matching  that maximises total output Q can
be sustained as a competitive equilibrium; i.e. there exist payo¤ functions u and v; with domains
T and T respectively, such that
u(x) + v(y)  f(x; y) for all (x; y) 2 T  T (7)
u(x) + v(y) = f(x; y) if and only if (x; y) 2 supp() (8)
10 If  is a matching then (AT ) = R
A
(x)dx and (T B) = R
B
(y)dy: Note that this assumes all agents are
matched. Section 6 extends the model to allow for unmatched agents.
11 If not, there must exist some t such that two partitions assign a di¤erent value to (t)  (t); a contradiction.
12Our use of Galichons Theorem 7.6 relies on the boundedness condition (6).
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where supp() denotes the support of : Thus
u(x) = max
y
f(x; y)  v(y) (9)
v(y) = max
x
f(x; y)  u(x) (10)
and the choices made by types x and y when they take as given the functions v and u respectively
in turn give the matching . This allows us rst to consider the matching that maximises total
output, and then to analyse the payo¤ functions that sustain this matching as an equilibrium.
2.2 The wavelike or periodic nature of the payo¤ functions.
We can identify some features of u and v that are independent of any further assumptions about
f and g and thus hold for any matching pattern.
Proposition 1 (i) u and v are both continuous.
(ii) For any t in T\T if u is increasing (resp. decreasing) at t, then v is decreasing (increasing)
at t.
(iii) if (x; y) 2 supp() and x 6= y; then u0(x) =  v0(y).
These three points put a particular structure on the payo¤ functions. Not surprisingly, like
attracts like produces important di¤erences from more is better. Higher types do not necessarily
receive a larger payo¤. When like attracts like, if a man of type x is taller than his partner of type
y; then a marginally shorter man, with type x0 < x; could match with the y type and generate a
higher joint output. This creates a rent for x0 so that u(x0) > u(x); i.e. u is decreasing at x: By
the same reasoning, v is increasing at y.
Taking all three points together, we can see that u and v behave in an opposite way to each
other: if x types match with y types and x and y are both in T \ T then if u is increasing at x
it is also increasing at y, and v is decreasing at both x and y. Then if u has a local minimum or
maximum at t; v has a local maximum or minimum respectively at t.
Two special cases are of interest. Firstly, if  = ; then unless almost all agents are perfectly
matched aggregate output is less than 
g(0). To induce each agent to choose a same-type
partner requires that u and v do not change too much. More precisely, suppose jv(t)  v(t0)j 
g(0)  g(t  t0): Then a man of type t cannot do better by choosing a woman of type t over one
of type t0; nor can a man of type t0 do better by choosing a woman of type t0 over one of type t:
But if jv(t)  v(t0)j > g(0)  g(t  t0), then either a type t man prefers a type t0 woman or a type
t0 man prefers a type t woman. Thus if  =  thenv(t)  v(t0)  g(0)  g(t  t0) for any (t; t0) 2 T  T (11)
A similar argument applies to womens choices; but simpler here is to note that if all agents are
perfectly matched then u+ v = g(0); so (11) impliesu(t)  u(t0)  g(0)  g(t  t0) for any (t; t0) 2 T  T (12)
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These conditions are satised if (but generally not only if) u and v are constant.
As a second special case, suppose all men are taller than all women. Then u must be strictly
decreasing over its domain T; otherwise there would be some men who, being taller and more
expensive, would never nd a partner. Similarly, v must be increasing over T : If all men are
shorter than all women, then u is increasing and v decreasing.
3 Concave g (supermodular f)
We now assume that g is strictly concave, or equivalently that f is supermodular. As is well
known, this implies that an equilibrium matching will display PAM (Lorentz (1953), Becker
(1973)). We represent this by the bijection  : T ! T dened by (t) =  ((t)): Then
(x) = arg max
y
[f(x; y)  v(y)]
 1(y) = arg max
x
[f(x; y)  u(x)]
If the two distributions are the same, then the maximum possible total output is 
g(0); which
cannot be achieved if a positive measure of couples are imperfectly matched. And since it is not
possible to match all (or even almost all) agents perfectly if  6=  , then (t) = t for almost all
t 2 T (i.e. homophily implies homogamy) if and only if  =  . If  6=  ; then only at points where
(t) =  (t) does like match with exactly like. Nevertheless, with g concave; there is a strong
tendency to homogamy: concavity places a small cost on small departures from perfect matching,
and an increasingly high cost on further departures, and the type di¤erences of matched couples
are evened out through PAM.
3.1 The structure of payo¤s
3.1.1 The type distributions are the same
As noted above, if  = , almost everyone is perfectly matched. If g is concave, the conditions
(11) and (12), limiting the rate of change in u and v, can only be satised if, for any (t; t0) 2 TT;v(t)  v(t0)  g0(0) (t  t0)u(t)  u(t0)  g0(0) (t  t0)
In particular, if g0(0) = 0 then both u and v are constant.
3.1.2 The type distributions are not the same.
If  6=  then from Lemma 1  6=  . The payo¤ functions then have a structure that is determined
by the intersections of  and  : To see this, suppose that (t) >  (t) for some type t. Then
(t) > t and t >  1(t), so if either partner is of type t then the man is of a lower type than the
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woman. Applying the analysis of Section 2.2, u is increasing and v is decreasing both at t and at
(t); similarly, if (t) <  (t), u is decreasing and v is increasing both at t and at (t)
Thus u and v have an alternating or wavelike pattern, governed by the behaviour of    ,
which equals zero at the m+ 1 points t; s1; :::; sm 1; t and changes sign m  1 times. With PAM,
(si) = si at each si, and if t is in the interior of Si then so are both  1(t) and  (t) : These
intervals dene m self-contained strata or "mini-economies": agents with types in Si match only
with other agents with types in Si. In -intervals u is increasing and v is decreasing; and the
opposite in  -intervals. Thus the wavelike stucture of the payo¤ functions follows if m > 1.
At the boundaries between intervals, fx(si; si) and fy(si; si) are not dened unless g0(0) = 0,
so although the payo¤ functions are continous, they may have kinks at these points. But as there











where we take u0 and v0 to be exogenously given such that u0 + v0 = f(x0; (x0)) for some
x0 2 T:
Note that an agents payo¤ may bear only a very weak relationship to the quality of the
match they are in. Indeed, at a point, say si; where  =   and u is at a local minimum, a
perfectly matched man, with utility u(si); will be surrounded (in type space) by imperfectly
matched men with a higher payo¤; and since v is at a local maximum at that point, a perfectly
matched woman will be surrounded by women with a lower payo¤. At the next intersection of
 and  ; si+1; u is at a local maximum and a perfectly matched man gets utility u(si+1);so that
u(si+1) > u(si): With a wavelike pattern of payo¤s, agents who are perfectly matched but of
di¤erent types typically do not get the same payo¤ as each other.
The analysis above allows us to draw some general conclusions about which types are better
o¤ than others. We have shown that u is increasing and v decreasing in -intervals, and the
opposite in  -intervals. If men tend to be shorter than women, then -intervals predominate
(in the sense of covering more of the type space T than -intervals), and on the whole it is
advantageous to be a taller man and a shorter woman. On the other hand, if the distribution of
male types is the more dispersed then -intervals predominate at the lower end of the type space
and  -intervals at the higher end, so that u tends to be initially rising and then falling, while v
does the opposite; it is then better to be a man in the midde of the male distribution, whereas
the better o¤ women are those at the extremes of the female distribution.
13
3.2 Examples using f(x; y) =   jx  yj with  > 1
3.2.1 Example (i): distributions that di¤er only in mean
We take x and y to be uniformly distributed, with (x) = 1 for x 2 [0; 1] and (y) = 1 for y 2
[1; 2]. Thus n = 2, m = 1 and [0; 2] is a -interval. With these type distributions (x) = 1 + x,
so that f(x; (x)) =   1: Equilibrium payo¤s are given by
u(x) = u0 + x
v(y) = v1 + (1  y)
where u0 + v1 =    1. In this example, it is an advantage to be close to the mass of agents on
the opposite side.
3.2.2 Example (ii): distributions with the same mean but di¤erent dispersion
Now let (x) = 1 for x 2 [1; 2] and (y) = 1=3 for y 2 [0; 3]. Thus n = 3 and m = 2; [ 0; 1:5]
is a  -interval, and [1:5; 3] is a  interval. Now (x) = 3(x  1); for x < 1:5 women are shorter
than their partners, and for x > 1:5 they are taller. Payo¤ functions are given by
u(x) = u1:5 + j3  2xj =2
v(y) = v1:5   31  j3  2yj =2
where u1:5 + v1:5 = . Figure 5 illustrates with  = 2.





In this example, men with types close to 1:5; the mean of both distributions, are disadvantaged,
whereas those with types near 1 or 2 benet from being close to the more extreme female types,
for whom a close match is di¢ cult.
3.2.3 Example (iii) : the wavelike pattern of payo¤s







0  y < 1
1  y < 3
3  y < 5
5  y  6
Thus n = 4 and m = 3; 
 = 12; (t) =  (t) at t = 0; 2; 4; and 6; and [0; 2]; [2; 4]; and [4; 6] are  ,









0  x  1:5
1:5  x  2:5
2:5  x  5:5
5:5  x  6




u0   22  + j2  xj
u0   31 j4  xj
u0   22  + j6  xj
0  x  1:5
1:5  x  2:5
2:5  x  5:5










2    21 j6  yj
0  y  1
1  y  3
3  y  5
5  y  6
where u0+ v0 = : Figure 6 illustrates with  = 2.
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Figure 6: payo¤s in example (iii) when  = 2
4 Convex g (f not supermodular)
We now assume that g is convex, reecting a diminishing marginal loss of surplus as the type
di¤erence jx   yj increases. This introduces a range of complications and we need new ways to
nd the matching that maximises output. The convexity of g places a high initial cost on small
departures from perfect matching and a low cost on further departures; the tendency to even
out the type di¤erences of matched couples that arises from homophilic preferences is thereby
greatly reduced, but not entirely eliminated. Although the equibrium matching now typically
exhibits neither PAM nor NAM, it nevertheless obeys some simple principles which we derive and
illustrate. We begin with two special instances which turn out to be important building blocks
in the more general case.
4.1 The type distributions are the same
As in the concave case, when  =  we have PAM with almost everyone perfectly matched: any
other matching implies that aggregate output is less than 
g(0): It is still the case that perfect
matching is sustained by payo¤ functions that do not change too much, and in particular when
u and v are both constant. However, consider the limits of the variation in the payo¤ functions
permitted by conditions (11) and (12): if (12) holds with equality for a pair (t; t0) and v(t) > v(t0);
then a man of type t can achieve his equilibrium payo¤ by choosing a woman of his own type or
of type t0; i.e. his maximand has two peaks, of exactly equal height, as does the maximand of a
type t0 woman, since u+ v = g(0). This feature of the equilibrium payo¤s when g is convex plays





have two maximising options.
4.2 No overlap between the type distributions
Suppose no man is taller and no woman is shorter than t0; i.e. x  y for (x; y) 2 T  T , with
equality only if x = y = t0: Then fxy(x; y) always exists and is negative for (x; y) 2 TT .13 Thus
f is e¤ectively submodular, and we have NAM. We represent this by the bijection  : T ! T
dened by (t) +  ((t)) = 
 so that 0(t) =  (t)=((t)): Then the payo¤ functions satisfy
(x) = arg max
y2T
[f(x; y)  v(y)] (13)
 1(y) = arg max
x2T
[f(x; y)  u(x)] (14)
so that in equilibrium:14
u0(x) = fx(x; (x)) for t  x  t0
v0(y) = fy( 1(y); y) for t0  y  t
If men are shorter than their partners; fx is positive and fy negative, so u is increasing and v
decreasing; if women are the shorter sex, fx is negative and fy positive, so u is decreasing and v
increasing. Furthermore
u00(x) = fxx(x; (x))
 
1  0(x) for t  x  t0
v00(y) = fyy( 1(y); y)
 
1  1=0( 1(y)) for t0  y  t
where we have used the fact that if x 6= y then fxx =  fxy = fyy: As 0 < 0; both u and v are
convex; indeed u00(x) > fxx(x; (x)) and v00(y) > fyy( 1(y); y); which are e¤ectively the second
order conditions for the maximisations in (13) and (14) respectively.
Thus despite the reversal of the matching pattern, the payo¤ functions are similar to the
PAM case with m = 1. This result complements the insight of Eeckhout and Kircher (2011)
that the matching pattern (PAM or NAM) cannot be identied just from the slope of the payo¤
functions. In their set-up, more x or more y is always better; here, with x always less than y;
more x or less y is always better, so regardless of the modularity or not of f , u is increasing and
v is decreasing.
4.2.1 Example (i) revisited
We reconsider the case where male and female types are uniformly distributed with unit density
on [0; 1] and [1; 2]; so  (x) = 2  x: As before, f(x; y) =   jx  yj but with  < 1 payo¤s are
13Note that fxy(t0; t0) = g00(0), being the limit of fxy(x; t0) as x tends to t0 from below.
14Note that although f is not concave in x or in y;the rst order conditions for xs choice of y and ys choice of
x can only be satised if  1(y) = x and (x) = y respectively. The second order conditions evaluated at these
points reduce to g00=0 < 0 and g00  0 < 0, which are satised due to the convexity of g and NAM, so that (x)
and  1(y) are indeed the maximising choices for types x and y respectively.
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given by
u(x) = u1   2 1(1  x) v(y) = v1   2 1(y   1)
where u1 + v1 = :
4.3 The matching pattern when the type distributions overlap
4.3.1 Maximum possible matching of like with like
We show now that when g is convex and the type distributions overlap, there is maximum possible
overall matching of like with like. There is maximum matching of like with like for a particular
type t if the density of type t men who are matched with type t women is (t) = minf(t); (t)g:
Then
R
T (t)dt is an upper bound on how much of the population can be in a perfect match; i.e.
(D)  RT (t)dt for any matching : But suppose (D) < RT (t)dt, and consider a man of type
t matched with a woman of type y and a woman of type t matched with a man of type x; where
y 6= t and x 6= t: Then this foursome can repartner, the t types together, and the x type with the
y type, and increase total output. That is to say
g(0) + g(jx  yj) > g(jt  xj) + g(jt  yj) (15)
which follows from g0 < 0 (if t is either less or greater than both x and y) or from g00 > 0 (if
t is between x and y). If (D) <
R
T (t)dt, then the repartnering described above can occur
on a su¢ cient scale to produce a measurable increase in overall output. We therefore have the
principle of Maximum Matching of Like with Like:
Proposition 2 If g is convex and  is an output maximising matching then (D) =R
T (t)dt:
4.3.2 Imperfect matching of the remaining subpopulation
Once we have matched like with like to the maximum possible extent, we are left with a sub-
population with types given by densities  and , where (t) = max((t)   (t); 0) and
(t) = max((t)   (t); 0): Thus the support of  (resp. ) is the union of the  intervals
(resp.   intervals) of T . Suppose i < j, where Ti is a   interval and Tj is a   interval, and
that a positive measure of men with types in Ti match with women with types in Tj . Then since
all the men are shorter than all the women, this submatchingmust display NAM; this is just
a simple extension of the no overlap analyis of Section 4.2. If Ti is a   interval and Tj an  
interval then all the women are shorter than all the men but again we have NAM.
The matching of the subpopulation with densities  and  thus consists of a number of such
submatchings, each displaying NAM. The NAM submatching between agents with types Ti and
those with types in Tj ; where i < j; is denoted by ij . By construction, j   i is odd; if j   i = 1;
then ij is an adjacent submatching. If ij matches a positive measure of such agents then we
say that ij has positive measure; the number of NAM submatchings with positive measure is
denoted by N .
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4.3.3 Almost perfect matching
Although there are no further perfect matches to be had once we have maximum matching of
like with like, there are still some almost perfect matches available to couples whose types are
close to each other but on opposite sides of the boundary between a  interval and an adjacent
 interval. Thus:
Proposition 3. If q is convex, every possible adjacent submatching has positive
measure.
As  and  intervals alternate, there are n   1 possible adjacent submatchings. Although
each exhibits NAM, if n > 2 there will be PAM between them; e.g. for n = 3 with  intervals
T1 and T3 and a  interval T2; very short men match with moderately short women (12), and
moderately tall women match with very tall men (23).
4.3.4 Forbidden Foursomes
Given the n intervals of the partition (t; t1; :::; tn 1; t); if there were a submatching of positive
measure between each   interval and each   interval, then we would have N = n2=4 if n
is even or N = (n2   1)=4 if n is odd. However, there are some combinations of submatchings
that we can rule out as ine¢ cient. These fall into two categories, illustrated in Figure 7, where
Ti < Tj < Tk < Tl.
Category A. Suppose two intervals of one type lie beween two of the other; for example, Ti and
Tl are   intervals and Tj and Tk are   intervals. Then if the jl and the ik sub-matchings
both have positive measure there is an obvious ine¢ ciency, as we could reassign agents from those
sub-matchings to the ij and kl submatchings, reducing the distance between partnerstypes
and increasing total output.
7 (ii) 2020 v3
Figure 7: (i) Category A ine¢ ciency; (ii) Category B ine¢ ciency
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Category B: Suppose the two intervals of one type contain agents that are shorter than agents
in the two intervals of the other type; for example, Ti and Tj are   intervals and Tk and Tl are
  intervals. Then all women are shorter than all men and overall we must have NAM, so the
ik and the jl submatchings cannot both have positive measure.
The following is immediate:
Proposition 4. If any submatching ij has positive measure, the subsets of Ti and Tj that
it matches are themselves intervals.
With these results we can now put further structure on the equilibrium matching pattern,
which in turn has implications for the structure of payo¤s.
4.3.5 The Watershed Principle
Of the imperfectly matched men with types in a  interval Ti; some will match with women with
lower types (i.e. in  intervals below Ti) and some with women with higher types (in  intervals
above Ti). But if a man with a type in Ti matches with a woman with a lower type than his
(e.g. in Ti 1) yet has a higher type than a man, also with a type in Ti, who matches with a
woman with a higher type (e.g. in Ti+1), then we have a Category A ine¢ ciency (with Ti the
union of the two middle intervals). This implies that each  interval Ti contains a critical type
(or watershed) xi , such that imperfectly matched men with types in Ti below x

i match only with
women with types below Ti and imperfectly matched men with types in Ti above xi match only
with women with types above Ti: Similarly, each  interval Tj contains a critical type yj ; such
that imperfectly matched women with types in Tj below yj match only with men with types
below Tj and imperfectly matched women with types in Tj above yj match only with men with
types above Tj :
Clearly the watersheds in T1 and Tn must be t and t respectively, but since all adjacent
NAM submatchings have positive measure, ti 1 < xi < ti for 1 < i < n if Ti is a  interval and
tj 1 < yj < tj for 1 < j < n if Tj is a  interval.
4.3.6 The Two Type Property
Consider the imperfectly matched men with types in a  interval Ti but below the watershed
xi ; i.e. in the open interval (ti 1; x

i ): They are matched with women all of whom have types
less than ti 1, so that the matching of this set of men and women displays NAM. For a man
with a type su¢ ciently close to ti 1; his partners type is in the adjacent  interval Ti 1 and
close to ti 1: As male type increases from ti 1 to xi , the partners type falls, possibly lying in
successively lower  intervals and thus inducing discontinuities in the relationship between male
and female types. However, there can only be a nite number of discontinuities (as n is nite);
furthermore, this relationship is strictly decreasing a at segment would imply a positive mass
of men matching with a single type of woman. A similar line of reasoning applies to men with
types in the interval (xi ; ti), and to other  intervals.
Thus, for almost every t in the support of ; there are at most two possible female types that
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a man of type t might match with: either he is perfectly matched, or he is imperfectly matched
to a woman with a type identied by the relevant NAM submatching as described in the previous
paragraph. Similarly, for almost every t in the support of  there are only two possible male
types that a woman of type t might match with: type t and one other. We therefore have the
Two Type Property (TTP):
Proposition 5: If  is an output maximising matching, then there exists a bijective
function  with domain supp() and image supp() such that if (x; y) 2 supp()
then either x = y or y =  (x):
The function  describes that part of the overall equilibrium matching where agents are
imperfectly matched and it embodies the principles derived above.15 It thus consists of N NAM
submatchings, each between a   interval and a   interval, n 1 of which are adjacent submatch-
ings where the matches are good but not perfect, and others where the gap between partners
types is large, possibly as great as t   t: Note that there is a nite number of male types (and
thus a zero mass of men) for whom in equilibrium, in addition to their own type, there are two
further possible female types, corresponding to a discontinuity referred to above, where a change
occurs from one NAM submatching to another.
Figure 8: the Two Type Property. The support 
of the equilibrium matching is shown in bold.
Figure 8 illustrates the Two Type Property when n = N = 4 and T is the support of both 
and : It shows  intervals T1 and T3 and  intervals T2 and T4. Men switch between 14 (the
15The function  is not quite unique. There may be a nite number of discontinuities where imperfectly matched
men in a given   interval, for example, switch from one  interval to another. At the precise point of discontinuity
(which is of measure zero) a man may match imperfectly with either of the two female types. We can ensure  is
single valued by arbitrarily assigning, at each discontinuity, one of the two female types.
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only non-adjacent submatching) and 12 at z1; at z2 women switch between 12 and 23; at z3
men switch between 23 and 34; and at z4 women switch between 34 and 14:16
4.4 Payo¤s when the type distributions overlap
We now pursue the implications of the principles developed above for the structure of the payo¤
functions u and v: It is perhaps the Two Type Property that has the most dramatic consequences.
Proposition 5 requires that u and v sustain what are in e¤ect two sub-equilibria, which combine
to form the overall equilibrium. In the rst, we have a subpopulation where both sides have type
density  where (t) = minf(t); (t)g: Agents choose a partner of their own type, so that
u(x) = f(x; x)  v(x)
v(y) = f(y; y)  u(y)
In the second sub-equilibrium, we have a subpopulation with type densities  and : Agents
choices are now given by the function  ; so that
u(x) = f(x;  (x))  v( (x))
v(y) = f(  1(y); y)  u(  1(y))
Thus u and v are such that f(x; y)   v(y) is maximised at y = x or y =  (x) for any x
2 supp() but only at y = x for x 2 supp(): Similarly f(x; y)  u(x) is maximised at x = y or
x =   1(y) for any y 2 supp() but only at x = y for y 2 supp():
To gain more insight into how the payo¤ functions sustain the equilibrium when g is convex,
consider a population initially with non-overlapping type densities e and e with supports [t; t1]
and [t1; t] respectively. As discussed in Section 4.2, it has a NAM equilibrium, and continuous
and convex payo¤ functions, which we label eu and ev; with domains [t; t1] and [t1; t]; eu is increasing
and ev is decreasing. We now expand the population to get overlapping densities  and , both
with support [t; t], where  e =  e, so the additional density is the same for men and women.
Thus the equilibrium matching of this larger population consists of a component where agents
are perfectly matched (with densities    e and    e); and the original NAM matching, with
densities e and e. Informally, the  function of the new equilibrium is the  function of the
original.
We construct the new payo¤ functions u and v as follows:
u(x) =
( eu(x) for x 2 [t; t1]
g(0)  ev(x) for x 2 [t1; t] (16)
v(y) =
(
g(0)  eu(y) for y 2 [t; t1]ev(y) for y 2 [t1; t] (17)
Note (i) u is increasing, and convex for x 2 [t; t1] and concave for x 2 [t1; t]; v is decreasing, and
16 In this example, t = x1 < z1 < t1 < z2 = y

2 < t2 < z3 = x







concave for y 2 [t; t1] and convex for x 2 [t1; t]; (ii) u(z) + v(z) = g(0) for all z 2 [t; t]:
We now conrm that this is indeed an equilibrium. Consider rst the choice of y by a
man of type x 2 [t; t1] seeking to maximise f(x; y)   v(y). By construction, the best y in [t1; t]
is  (x); yielding a payo¤ of eu(x). This is just the optimal choice of an x type man in the
initial equilibrium; in particular it is strictly worse to choose t1 over  (x): For y 2 [t; t1] the
maximand is f(x; y)   g(0) + eu(y): For y < x, both f(x; y) and eu(y) are increasing in y; so we
can ignore y 2 [t; x); and focus on y 2 [x; t1]. Over this interval f(x; y) is decreasing and convex
in y and eu(y) is increasing and convex, implying that we need only consider y = x and y = t1
as possible choices. The former yields a payo¤ of eu(x); and the latter yields less than eu(x),
since it is strictly worse to choose t1 over  (x): Consider now the choice of y by a man of type
x 2 [t1; t]. For y < x; f(x; y) is increasing and v is decreasing in y; so this leaves y 2 [x; t1]:
For x < y  t1, both fy(x; y) and v0(y) are negative; however, since v0(y) = fy(  1(y); y) and
  1(y) < x < y; then fy(x; y)   v0(y) < 0: Thus the unique optimal choice is y = x; giving a
payo¤ of u(x) = g(0)   v(x): A similar argument applies to the choice of x by a woman of type
y seeking to maximise f(x; y)  v(y): For y 2 [t; t1];the optimal choice is x = y; and for y 2 [t1; t]
a maximum is attained by x = y or x =   1(x).
One way to view the result above is that (16) and (17) exploit to the full the variation in
the functions u and v permitted by conditions (11) and (12). Consequently, not only do u and
v support same-type partnerships for all agents, but for those on the long or denser side of the
market, there is an equally good alternative, as the reasoning above in e¤ect shows that (11) and
(12) hold with equality for t 6= t0 if and only if either t = (t0) or t0 = (t):
Example (i) extended We take the equilibrium in Section 4.2.1 above with x and y initially
uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and [1; 2]; and add the same uniform density to both sides. Now
(x) =
(
2 for 0  x < 1
1 for 1  x < x and (y) =
(
1 for 0  y < 1
2 for 1  y < 2
In the new equilibrium matching, a subpopulation with unit densities on [0; 1] for men and [1; 2]
for women respectively matches with NAM (i.e.  (x) = 2   x); the remainder match like with
like, both sides having unit density on [0; 2]: This equilibrium is sustained by payo¤s
u(x) =
(
u1   2 1(1  x) for 0  x  1
u1 + 2




 1(1  y) for 0  y  1
v1   2 1(y   1) for 1  y  2
where u1 + v1 = : Figure 9 shows u and v for  = 5 and  = 0:5, with u1 = 2 and v1 = 3.
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Figure 9: payo¤s in example (i) extended 
Figure 10: choice of y to maximise f(x; y)  v(y) when (i) x = 0:5 (ii) x = 1:5
Figure 10 demonstrates the working of the Two Type Property. Panel (i) shows the choice facing
a man of type 0.5: u(0:5) can be attained by choosing partners of type 0:5 or 1:5; Panel (ii) shows







(i)   f(0.5, y)
       -  v(y)
(ii)    f(1,5, y) 
        - v(y)
4.4.1 Construction of u and v in the general case
We can apply the reasoning above to each of the N NAM submatchings of positive measure,
whether they are adjacent or not.17 Suppose a NAM submatching ij can be sustained as an
equilibrium outcome by payo¤ functions euij and evij , with domains Mij and Wij respectively,
bearing in mind that we have a degree of freedom, since euij + c and evij   c also sustain ij as an
equilibrium. We then construct uij and vij so that
uij(x) =
( euij(x) for x 2Mij
g(0)  evij(x) for x 2Wij
vij(y) =
(
g(0)  euij(y) for y 2Mijevij(y) for y 2Wij
For each NAM submatching ij we thus have a pair uij and vij ; both with domainDij = Mij[Wij .
The functions uij and vij are uniquely dened (up to a constant).18 Hence over the set Dij
the payo¤ functions u and v must equal uij and vij respectively; otherwise some agents with types
in Dij will not choose partners in accordance with Proposition 5. The union of the domains Dij
across all N submatchings is the type space T; so we have all the ingredients to construct u and
v: We must do this in a way that (i) ensures the continuity of u and v; and (ii) allows u+ c and
v   c also to be equilibrium payo¤ functions.
To do this, we take advantage of the N of the degrees of freedom a¤orded by the N pairs of
functions uij and vij . If all N submatchings are adjacent (i.e. N = n 1), this is straightforward:
each domain Dij is an interval, with j  i = 1; so denoting by zi the boundary between Di 1;i and
Di;i+1 (where agents with types in Ti switch from i 1;i and i;i+1) we need to use one degree of
freedom to set ui 1;i(zi) = ui;i+1(zi); and thus vi 1;i(zi) = vi;i+1(zi): Then there are N   1 such
boundaries, using up N   1 degrees of freedom, leaving just one to reect the indeterminacy in
u and v.
If not all NAM submatchings are adjacent (i.e. N > n   1) we can still use N   1 degrees
of freedom to stitch together the N payo¤ functions uij and vij . However, the domain Dij
corresponding to a non-adjacent submatching ij is not an interval: there is a gap between Mij
and Wij . It might thus appear that we have too many points at which to ensure continuity, the
lower and upper boundaries of both Mij and Wij ; and not enough degrees of freedom. But these
boundaries are optimal: the points at which agents switch from one submatching to another,
embodied in the graph of the function  , gives the output maximising matching. As we now
show, this optimality is su¢ ciently informative to establish continuity.
A Simple Example We return to the case in Figure 8. There are four boundaries or
switchpoints z1; z2; z3; and z4. In constructing u (with v = g(0)   u), we can ensure conti-
17The argument at the beginning of Section 4.4 assumes type densities e and e with supports [t; t1] and [t1; t]
respectively, in accordance with Assumption 1. But it is straightforward to extend the reasoning to a case of
supports [t; t0] and [t00; t] where t0 < t00; which can then be applied to non-adjacent submatchings.
18This is since deuij=dx = fx (x;  (x)) and devij=dy = fy    1(y); y ; so only euij and evij (plus or minus c) will
sustain ij ; and the two type property requires uij + vij = g(0).
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nuity at z1;z2; and z3 by using three degrees of freedom of the four available and set u14(z1) =
u12(z1); u12(z2) = u23(z2); and u23(z3) = u34(z3): This leaves one degree as required, to reect the
indetermacy in u and v: To ensure continuity at z4; we use the optimality of the four switchpoints.
More precisely,
Proposition 6 For n = N = 4; with optimal switchpoints z1; z2; z3 and z4
f(z1; z4) + f(z3; z2) = f(z1; z2) + f(z3; z4): (18)
Thus NAM and PAM give the same output at the switchpoints, the result of a balance be-
tween homogamy pushing the economy towards PAM and Jensens inequality for convex functions
pulling in the opposite direction. 19:
12 matches shorter men with taller women; in particular it matches men of type z1 with
women of type z2; and they share the resulting output, so that u12 (z1) +v12 (z2) = f(z1; z2): But
by construction u12 (z2) + v12 (z2) = g(0); thus
u12 (z2)  u12 (z1) = g(0)  f(z1; z2) (19)
Similarly,
u23 (z3)  u23 (z2) = f(z3; z2)  g(0); (20)
u34 (z4)  u34 (z3) = g(0)  f(z3; z4); (21)
u14 (z4)  u14 (z1) = g(0)  f(z1; z4): (22)
With continuity at z1; z2; and z3;(so that u14(z1) = u12(z1); u12(z2) = u23(z2); and u23(z3) =
u34(z3)); and using the result of Proposition 6, equations (19) to (22) imply that u34(z4) =
u14(z4): We therefore need only three of the four available degrees of freedom to stitch together
u12; u23; u34; and u14 to construct continuous payo¤ functions u and v; with one degree of freedom
left as required.
More complex congurations of NAM submatchings This approach can be extended
to accommodate any equilibrium pattern of matching. A full analysis of the general case is given
in Appendix B, which shows how, when g is convex, matched agents form into hierarchies of self-
contained subpopulations or strata. The boundaries within and between the strata are optimal;
together with N   1 degrees of freedom from the N available, this is su¢ ciently informative to
establish the continuity of u and v; with exactly one degree of freedom remaining as required.
19Note that as f(z1; z4) is less than both f(z1; z2) and f(z3; z4); (ccc) implies f(z3; z2) is greater than both. Thus
z3   z2 is less than both z4   z3 and z2   z1; so the middle adjacent submatching, 23; covers a narrower span of
types than 12 and 34:
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4.5 Examples using f(x; y) =   jx  yj with  < 1
4.5.1 Example (ii) revisited
When (x) = 1 for x 2 [1; 2] and (y) = 1=3 for y 2 [0; 3], the two distributions have an overlap
of density 13 on the  interval [1; 2], giving us the extent of like matching with like. This leaves
a subset of men with types distributed on [1; 2] with density23 to be matched with women with
types distributed on [0; 1] and [2; 3] with density 13 : To avoid a Category A ine¢ ciency, the women
with types in [0; 1] must match with the men with types in [1; 1:5]; and the women with types
in [2; 3] must match with the men with types in [1:5; 2]; and to avoid a Category B ine¢ ciency,





for x 2 [1; 1:5]
for x 2 [1:5; 2]
To sustain this outcome as a competitive equilibrium, the payo¤ functions u and v must be such
that for men maximising   jx  yj   v(y) and women maximising   jx  yj   u(x)
a man of type x 2 [1; 1:5] chooses either y = x or y = 3  2x
a man of type x 2 [1; 1:5] chooses either y = x or y = 3  2x
a woman of type y 2 [0; 1] chooses x = 1:5  y=2
a woman of type y 2 [1; 2] chooses x = y
a woman of type y 2 [2; 3] chooses x = 3  y=2
These conditions are satised if:
u(x) =
(
u1   3 1(x  1)
u1   3 1(2  x)
for 1  x  1:5
for 1:5  x  2
v(y) =
8>>>><>>>>:





v1   (1:5) 1 (y   2)
for 1  x  1:5
for 1  y  1:5
for 1:5  y  2
for 2  y  3
where u1 + v1 = . See Figure 11, where  = 0:5.
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Figure 11: example (ii) with  = 0:5
4.5.2 Example (iii) revisited and extended
To illustrate how we can determine which NAM submatchings have positive measure, we revisit
example (iii) in Section 3.2.3, but with  < 1: To derive the optimal matching we rst apply the







0  z < 1
1  z < 3
3  z < 5
5  z  6







0  x < 1
1  x < 3
3  x < 5







0  y < 1
1  y < 3
3  y < 5
5  y  6
Thus we have -intervals, T1 = [0; 1] and T3 = [3; 5] and -intervals T2 = [1; 3] and T4 = [5; 6].
From Proposition 4, 12; 23 and 34 have positive measure. To determine whether 14 also has
measure measure, we use the analysis of Appendix B. z1 2 T1 marks the switch between 14 and
12: The marginal e¤ect of z1 on agggregate output Q is given by
dQ
dz1
=   (6  2z1)   (2 + 2z1)] + (2  2z1) + (2  2z1) (23)
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which is decreasing in z1 and negative when evaluated at z1 = 0. Thus in equilibrium z1 = 0,






1  x  2
2  x  3
5  x  6
We now axtend this example so that 14 has positive measure. In the interval [ 1; 0] we add
a density 2 of male types and 3 of female types, and in [6; 7] we add a density 2 of male types and
and 1 of female types, so the population remains balanced with 
 = 16. We now have -intervals,
T1 = [ 1; 1] and T3 = [3; 5] and -intervals T2 = [1; 3] and T4 = [5; 7]. Equation (23) still holds,
but with the expanded population z1 is now bounded below by  1; at which point dQdz1 > 0:Thus
Q is maximised at some z1 beween  1 and 0 such that
 (6  2z1)   (2 + 2z1) + (2  2z1) + (2  2z1) = 0: (24)







1  x  2  z1
2  z1  x  3
5  x  6  z1
6  z1  x  7




 1(3  x)  1  x  z1
u1 + 2
 1(1  x) z1  x  1
u1   2 1(x  1) 1  x  2  z1
u3   2 1(3  x) 2  z1  x  3
u3 + 2
 1(x  3) 3  x  4 + z1
u5 + 2
 1(5  x) 4 + z1  x  5
u5   2 1(x  5) 5  x  6  z1
u0   2 1(x  3) 6  z1  x  7
v(y) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
v0   2 1(3  y)  1  y  z1
v1   2 1(1  y) z1  y  1
v1 + 2
 1(y   1) 1  y  2  z1
v3 + 2
 1(3  y) 2  z1  y  3
v3   2 1(y   3) 3  y  4 + z1
v5   2 1(5  y) 4 + z1  y  5
v5 + 2
 1(y   5) 5  y  6  z1
v0 + 2
 1(y   3) 6  z1  y  7
(25)
where ui + vi =  for i = 0; 1; 3; 5; and continuity at z1 ; 2  z1 ;and 4 + z1 ;is achieved by setting
u0 = u1+2
 1[(1 z1)  (3 z1)]; u1 = u3+2 1[(1 z1)  (1+z1)];and u3 = u5+2 1[(1 
z1) (1+z1)]: The rst order condition (24) then implies that u5 = u0+2 1[(1 z1) (3 z1)];
thus ensuring continuity at 6  z1 .
Broadly, there are three e¤ects on the matching pattern of this particular expansion in the
population. Firstly, there is more PAM due to the additional overlap between ' and : Secondly,
as 14 now has positive measure, some couples are badly matched, including those with the
largest possible type di¤erence of 8: Thirdly, there are changes to the other NAM submatchings:
the submatchings 12 and 34 now include more agents, but 23 has fewer. This has important
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consequences for the payo¤ functions.20 With 12 and 34 the women are shorter than their
partners, and hence v is rising over the now larger intervals [z1 ; 2   z1 ] and [4 + z1 ; 6   z1 ];
with 23 the women are taller than their partners, so v is falling over the now smaller interval
[2 z1; 4+z1]. In addition, with 14 the women are shorter than their partners, so v is rising over
[ 1; z1 ] and [6 z1 ; 7]: Figure 12 shows v before and after the addition of more short women than
short men and more tall men than tall women;  = 0:5 and v(3) is assumed to be unchanged.
u = g(0)  v so the e¤ect on u is the opposite.
Figure 12: the e¤ect on v(y) in example (iii) when  = 0:5 of adding more
women than men with low types and more men than women with high types
5 The periodicity of u and v:
Whether g is concave or convex, the payo¤ functions u and v tend to display a wavelike or
periodic structure, despite the very di¤erent matching patterns. We now analyse the similarities,
and di¤erences, of the two cases in more detail.
We start with g convex, and with  6= . From Section 4.3.5, a  interval Ti contains a
critical watershed, xi such that men with types in Ti that are less (resp. greater) than x

i match
with women with types below (resp. above) Ti, implying that u reaches a local minimum, and v
a local maximum, at xi : If Ti is a  interval, v reaches a local minimum and u a local maximum
at the watershed yi . From Assumption 2, there are n alternating  and  intervals, T1; :::Tn.
The watersheds in T1 and Tn are t and t respectively, so that u and v both have n   2 turning
points (recall that n  2 if  6= ).






                                                                                   . 
  v(3) is assumed to be unchanged.  
In the concave case, the turning points of u and v occur at the m   1 points s1; :::; sm 1
where (si) =  (si) and agents are perfectly matched. By Lemma 1, m < n; so in comparing the
periodicity of the value functions in the concave and convex cases, one critical issue is whether
m = n  1, a condition that depends only on the two type distributions. If m < n  1; then the
payo¤ functions have more turning points in the convex case. But if m = n   1; then not only
do the two cases have the same number of turning points, but also:
Proposition 7 If m = n  1 the turning points of u and v occurs at the same types
in the concave case as in the convex case; thus if Ti is a  interval then xi = si 1
and if Ti is a  interval yi = si 1:
The following is almost immediate:
Propisition 8 If g is convex, there are no non-adjacent NAM submatchings if and
only if m = n  1:
5.1 The amplitude of u and v
Some men have a higher payo¤ than others, and similarly for women. What determines these
di¤erences? That is to say, if u and v are wavelike, what determines the amplitude of the
waves? To make a comparison of the concave and convex cases that controls for any di¤erences
in periodicity, we assume that m = n   1: Applying the analysis above, if Ti is a  interval
with watershed xi ; then Ti+1 is a  interval with watershed yi+1; and [xi ; yi+1] = [si 1; si]; a
 interval. Assuming the same distributions  and ; in both cases u has a local minimum, and
v a local maximum, at xi , followed by a local maximum of u and a local minimum of v at y

i+1:
This reiterates the importance of the gender di¤erence in the type densities; for a man (resp.
woman) it is bad (resp. good) to be in the middle of a  interval at some watershed xi ; and
good (resp. bad) to be in the middle of a  interval at some watershed yi+1.
But what determines the di¤erence  = u(yi+1) u(xi ); or equivalently v(xi )  v(yi+1)? In
the concave case, we have PAM, and
u(yi+1)  u(xi ) =
R yi+1
xi
fx(t; (t))dt = conc (26)
Given the surplus function f ; conc is therefore determined by the type distributions via the
points xi and y

i+1and the matching function  =  
 1().21 In the convex case, we have NAM
amongst the imperfectly matched agents, pairing men of type xi with women of type y

i+1: Thus










i+1) = g(0);(perfectly matched agents share the
largest possible output), so
u(yi+1)  u(xi ) = g(0)  f(xi ; yi+1) = conv (27)








i < t < y

i+1, t < (t) and fx(t; (t)) > 0.
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which, in contrast to conc, is determined by the type distribution only via the points xi and
yi+1:
To explore this contrast further, we now consider the e¤ect on conc and conv of three
possible changes in the type distributions. In each the functions , ;; and   are replaced byb,b, b; and b , and the equilibrium matching  by b:
(i) Replication Suppose b = a and b = a, where a > 0: Thus b = a and b  = a : The
economy is e¤ectively replicated, and this can be accommodated by an equiproportionate change
in the matching, so that b = a. Any particular type on one side of the market matches with
the same type, or set of types, from the other side, so the payo¤ functions u and v, which both
incentivise and give the outcome of choice of partner, are unchanged, as are conc and conv.
(ii) Balanced change We now add the same integrable function b; with support T; to both 
and ; i.e. b = + b and b = + b; Thus    = b  b and b  b  =    ; so there is no change
in n;m;the partitions (t; t1; :::; tn 1; t) and (t; s1; :::; sm 1; t); or the watersheds (xi or y

i ) of each
interval Ti: However, away from the points t; s1; :::; sm 1; t; the function that describes positive
sorting does change.  is dened by (x) =  ((x)): Let B(t) =
R t
t b(s)ds; PAM is now given byb; where
(x) +B(x) =  (b(x)) +B(b(x)): (28)
A change to  and  will therefore change the pattern of matching under concavity and, via
equation (26), the rise or fall in payo¤s between the (unchanged) points xi and y

i+1: Equation
(28) implies that, for xi < x < y

i+1; x < b(x) < (x):22 Thus f(x; b(x)) > f(x; (x)) and 0 <
fx(x; b(x) < fx(x; (x)): Then dening bconc = R yi+1xi fx(t; b(t))dt, we have 0 < bconc < conc :
adding the same density to both sides results in better matches, and reduces the advantage of
those of a relatively scarce type (e.g. men of type yi+1) compared to those who type is relatively
abundant. (e.g. men of type xi ): Extending this analysis to all turning points of u and v; we see
that insofar as the payo¤ functions are periodic or wavelike, their amplitude is reduced.
In the convex case, the forces driving the matching pattern and the payo¤ functions are
very di¤erent. In particular, u and v can be constructed from the requirement to match the
subpopulation with non-overlapping type densities  and ; where (t) = max((t)  (t); 0)
and (t) = max((t) (t); 0): Since the functions  and  are both unchanged by the addition
of b to  and ; the functions u and v are unchanged, as therefore is conv: This surprising result
follows from the fact that when g is convex perfect matching can be sustained by any pair of
payo¤ functions from a set of pairs that have limited variation over the domain T . This set does
not depend on  and ; but it includes the pair, unique up to a constant c; that support the
equilibrium choices of the imperfectly matched agents with unchanged densities  and .
22Applying the transformation   1 to both sides of (28), (x)   b(x) =   1B(b(x))     1(B(x)):   1 and B
are both increasing, so (x)  b(x) has the same sign as b(x) x: Thus for x 6= (x) (i.e. for x =2 ft; s1; :::; sm 1; tg
either (x) > b(x) > x or x > b(x) > (x):
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(iii) Increase in the dispersion of types To simplify notation in this section, we set t = 0:
We now make all agents are taller by a factor a; where a > 1; "stretching out" the type space
by replacing T = [0; t] with bT = [0; at]; so that b(ax) = (x) and b (ay) =  (y): PAM is
now dened by the function b; where b(x) = b (b(x)), or equivalently b(ax) = a(x): Thusb(ax)  ax = a((x)  x):
If t is a xed point of ; then at is a xed point of b, so in analysing the amplitude of the
payo¤ functions, the turning points of u at xi and y

i+1 are replaced by turning points of bu at
axi and ay

i+1: We now have


















where the second inequality arises since, for xi < t < y

i+1; b(at)  at > (t)  t > 0 and fx(x; y)
is positive and increasing in the type di¤erence y   x:
Increased dispersion of the type distributions in the concave case therefore increases the
amplitude of the waves of the payo¤ functions and increases the advantages of being a scarce
type compared to an abundant type. This arises for two reasons, corresponding to the two
inequalities above: (i) ayi+1  axi > yi+1  xi ; so there is a greater range over which payo¤s
rise and fall between turning points; (ii) the uniform "stretching" of the population means that,
unless perfectly matched, all agents are more distant (in type space) from their partners; concavity
implies an increasing marginal cost of mismatch, so the rents to be extracted from a good match
are greater, increasing the slope of the payo¤ functions.
In the convex case, we have a similar result, but the reasoning is much simpler:
bconc = g(0)  f(axi ; ayi+1) > g(0)  f(xi ; yi+1) = conv
where the inequality arises since f is a decreasing function of the type di¤erence.
6 Payo¤s with outside options
In equilibrium, total output is maximised subject to the constraint of the type distributions of
men and women. Thus the payo¤ functions can be interpreted as measures of the e¤ect on
maximised output of the marriage market if we relax or tighten the constraint. If we embed our
marriage market in a wider economy where single agents have other opportunities, we can analyse
which agents end up married by requiring that equilibrium maximises the aggregate output of the
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wider economy, including the marriage market. Payo¤s that support this equilibrium will then
ensure not only that married agents choose the partners that collectively maximise the output of
the marriage market, but also that no married agent is better o¤ single and vice versa.
When more is always better, this is straightforward because it is the lower types who are
single: unambigously they contribute less to total output in the marriage market and this is
reected in payo¤ functions which, for matched agents, are always increasing in type. But when
like attracts like, which agents are matched and which are single is not obvious. The payo¤
functions are not necesssarily monotonic, and whether an agent contributes more or less than
others cannot be deduced merely from knowing his or her type, but depends on both type
distributions.
6.1 Payo¤s as measures of the contribution of types to total output
Consider a balanced population with equal measures of men and women, all matched in the
marriage market, and a supermodular output function f . To calculate the marginal e¤ect on total
output if we take out a man of some arbitrary type x1; suppose his partner of type y1 = (x1) now
becomes the unpartnered woman. This leaves unchanged the partners of the remaining agents,
and output falls by f(x1; y1): Alternatively, we could leave in the y1 type woman, and take out
some other woman, with type y2 = y1 + y; where y is small and positive. In this case we
have to repartner a man with type x2 =  1(y2), so we match him with the y1 woman and leave
all other pairings unchanged. This preserves PAM for all type pairs below (x1; y1) and above
(x2; y2): The (x2; y1) pairing introduces a degree of sub-optimality, depending on the size of y:
The loss of output is now
f(x1; y1)  f(x2; y1) + f(x2; y2)
which for small enough y can be approximated by
f(x1; y1) + fy(x2; y2)y
If we leave in the type y2 woman and take out instead a woman with type y3 = y2 + y; and
pair x3 =  1(y3 _) with y2 then the output loss is approximately
f(x1; y1) + fy(x2; y2)y + fy(x3; y3)y
Continuing in this way, the consequence of rebalancing the population by taking out a woman of





where y = (yp   y1)=(p   1): If we x the value of yp, and let y ! 0 and p ! 1, then the
approximation to the loss of output if the marriage market loses a man of type x1 and a woman
34
of type yp converges to





But the integral is exactly the expression for v(yp)   v(y1): Since f(x1; y1) = u(x1) + v(y1);we
have
(x1; yp) = u(x1) + v(yp):
This general line of analysis does not depend on the particular functional form of f . It is
Kantorovichs duality in action, showing how the function (x; y) = u(x) + v(y) puts a value on
the contribution to the marriage market of a man of type x and a woman of type y, whatever
the technology:23 These two are not necessarily matched in equilibrium: (x; y) allows for the
rematching of those agents remaining in the market. If x types and y types are not matched in
equlibrium then u(x) + v(y) > f(x; y), so (x; y) > f(x; y): This may seem surprising, but an
alternative interpretation of (x; y) is the increase in output if we add an x type man and a y
type woman. Then f(x; y) is a lower bound on the additional output, and u(x) + v(y)  f(x; y)
is the further gain due to rematching.
6.2 Equilibrium with payo¤s to being single
Suppose now that single men and single women get payo¤s of u and v respectively. With these
two additional pieces of information we can determine who is matched and who is single, and also
resolve the indeterminacy in u and v. Conceptually, we can easily incorporate the possibility that
some agents are single into our model. Since g(x  y) decreases with the di¤erence jx  yj; there
is a unique d such that g(d) = u + v: An equilibrium with single agents is therefore equivalent
to one where all agents are matched, with a surplus function f(x; y) such that f(x; y) = u + v
for jx   yj > d: Couples for whom jx   yj < d are actually married, and produce a joint output
more than they could get if single; couples for whom jx  yj > d are actually single and produce
a joint output u+ v; if jx  yj = d; whether the couple are married or single they produce a joint
output u + v.24 As for the indeterminacy in the payo¤ functions, given that not all agents are
married, single men get u and single women get v; this xes both u and v.
To see how we can determine who is married and who is single, suppose we have an initial
equilibrium where u and v are low and no agent is single. If we increase u or v, to restore
equilibrium requires that we remove from the marriage market any couple, not necesarily matched
to each other, such that u(x)+v(y) < u+v; aggregate output then rises by u+v (x; y): Thus,
we remove the agents with low payo¤s, i.e. men with types where u is at a minimum and women
with types where v is at a minimum. As we have seen in both the concave and convex cases,
agents with low payo¤s are those with types in relative abundance. But if we remove all the men
with types at or around some point t where u is at a minimum and (t) > 0, we will produce
23Note that (x; y) does not give the contribution of an x type man in isolation. If a man leaves the marriage
market, then it becomes unbalanced and we have more women than men. (x; y) measures the loss of output if
balance is restored by the departure from the market of a y type woman.
24Although this interpretation violates Assumption 1 (as g(jx yj) is not decreasing for jx yj > d) it nevertheless
satises the conditions in Galichon (Propositions 2.2 and 2.3, and Theorem 7.6).
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a relative scarcity of men with types at or near t; this would create a local maximum of u at t;
implying that total output could be increased by returning to the marriage market some men
of type t and making other men single. Thus we should remove relatively abundant male types
up to, but not beyond, the point where they are no longer relatively abundant, and similarly for
female types.
As agents move from the marriage market to being single, the type distributions of the
remaining agents change, which may require the remaining agents to repartner. If an (x; y) pair
are initially married and become single, then (x; y) = f(x; y); there is thus no rematching of the
remaining married agents. But if the (x; y) pair are not initially married, then (x; y) > f(x; y)
and the remaining married agents must rematch to re-establish optimality.
6.2.1 Which types are married and which remain single? A simple example
To x ideas, we return to example (ii), where (x) = 1 for x 2 [1; 2] and (y) = 1=3 for y 2 [0; 3],
with the joint output of married couples given by f(x; y) =  jx yj. If all agents are married,
then whether  is greater or less than 1, u has a minimum and v a maximum at 1:5; and v has
minima and u maxima at both 0 and 3: If not all agents are married, i.e. u and v are binding
lower constraints on payo¤s, then the arguments above suggest that single men will have types
around 1:5, the centre of the male distribution, whereas single women will have types at the
extremes of the female distribution. Then the symmetry of the distributions means that we can
characterise equilibrium by a single variable  , whose value depends on u+ v:Women with types
below  or above 3    are single; they have a total mass of 2=3: This is balanced by an equal
mass of single men, with types with a uniform density of 2=3 in the interval [1:5  =2; 1:5 + =2]:
Married womens types are thus distributed with density 1=3 on the interval [ ; 3    ]; married
mens types have density 1 on [1; 1:5  =2], density 1=3 on [1:5  =2; 1:5 + =2]; and density 1
on [1:5 + =2; 2].
g concave for married couples If  > 1 then we have PAM amongst the married
population, with a matching pattern  given by
(x) =
8><>:
3(x  1) +  for 1  x  1:5  =2
x for 1:5  =2  x  1:5 + =2
3(x  1)    for 1:5 + =2  x  2
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Single agents get u or v; so equilibrium payo¤ functions that support the partner choices of the
married population and the marital status of all agents are
u(x) =
8><>:
u+ (3  2x  )=2 for 1  x  1:5  =2
u for 1:5  =2  x  1:5 + =2
u+ (2x  3  )=2 for 1:5 + =2  x  2
v(y) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
v for y  
v + 1:5(1  )   1:5(1  2y+3 ) for   y  1:5  =2
a  u for 1:5  =2  y  1:5 + =2
v + 1:5(1  )   1:5(2y 3   1) for 1:5 + =2  y  3  
v for 3    y
where  is determined by continuity of v at 1:5  =2 and 1:5 + =2; thus u+ v = a  1:5(1  ):
This shows that  is an increasing function of u+v; (conditional on not all agents being married).
The e¤ects of changes in u or v are straightforward to analyse. If u increases, then so
does  and more men and women become single. Women initially single still get v: All women
initially married are worse o¤: some become single and get v; others stay married (but to di¤erent
partners) but v(y) falls. Initally single men stay single and are better o¤; some intially married
men become single and are better o¤; men who remain married are better o¤ as u(x) increases.
Similar e¤ects follow if v increases, mutatis mutandis.25
g convex for married couples In the case of example (ii), when  < 1 and all agents
are married (i.e. when the constraints u and v do not bind) we have a mix of PAM and NAM. In
contrast to the situation when  > 1; the NAM component of the population matches low payo¤
men (in the middle of the male type distribution) with low payo¤ women (at the extremes of the
female distribution). Thus if we start to remove from the marriage market pairs of agents with the
lowest payo¤s, these will be married couples. Consequently, there is no change in the matching
pattern of the remaining married couples (if there were then the initial equlibrium, as it applied
to these couples, would have been suboptimal). Formally, for the (x; y) pair with the lowest value
of (x; y); and thus the rst candidates for removal, we have u(x) + v(y) = f(x; y) = (x; y); the
same equalities hold for subsequent pairs, and we keep moving them from the marriage market
into singlehood up to the point where (x; y) = u+ v.
The matching pattern of the married population thus has perfect matching for types in the





for 1  x  1:5  =2
1:5 + =2  x  2
25 In particular, some women will be better o¤ single. Thus the model is consistent with the Beckerian account
of increasing divorce in the 1950s and 1960s not as a result of change in divorce legislation (an explanation that
is, of course, totally at odds with the Coasian avour of transferable utiity) but due to improved labour market
opportunities for women.
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   (x  1)) for 1  x  1:5  =2
u for 1:5  =2  x  1:5 + =2
u+ 3 1((1 2 )
   (2  x)) for 1:5 + =2  x  2
v(y) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
v for y  
v + 1:5 1((1  )   (1  y)) for   y  1
a  u  3 1((1 2 )   (y   1)) for 1  y  1:5  =2
a  u for 1:5  =2  y  1:5 + =2
a  u  3 1((1 2 )   (2  y)) for 1:5 + =2  y  2
v + 1:5 1((1  )   (y   2)) for 2  y  3  
v for 3    y
Continuity of v at y = 1 implies that u+ v = a  (1:5(1  )), dening  as increasing function
of u + v (simular to but not the same function as in the concave case). In the convex case,
1:5(1   ) is the type di¤erence of the married couples with the greatest mismatch: y =  and
x = 1:5  =2, or y = 3   and x = 1:5 + =2, for whom u(x) = u and v(y) = v:
7 Conclusion and discussion
There is a wide range of economic and social situations where it is reasonable to assume that
agents are drawn to others of a similar type. If we embed this hypothesis of like attracts like in
a model of two-sided matching with transferable utility, we arrive at conclusions that di¤er in
many respects from the more standard assumption of more is always better.
The pattern of matching and sorting, in particular whether we have PAM or NAM, is driven
by factors many of which play no role in the standard model. If the two distributions are the same,
then whatever the precise technology we have PAM, as all agents can be perfectly matched. If the
two distributions are not the same, then the surplus technology is critical. But while concavity
of the output function g is equvalent to supermodularity and generates PAM, convexity is not
equivalent to submodularity and leads to NAM only in very special circumstances - when there
is no overlap in the supports of the two type distributions.
If the two distributions overlap but are not the same, then in the convex case we have
maximum matching of like with exactly like and a two-type property: if a man (for example) of
type t is on the long side of the market for his type, so (t) > (t), then he is indi¤erent between
matching with a woman of type t and one of a di¤erent type given by the function  (t), whereas a
woman of type t optimises only by choosing a man of type t: This property of non-unique choices
for a positive mass of agents is an essential feature of the equilibrium, and is not found in the
standard model.
That more is not always better is reected in the equilibrium payo¤ functions u and v:
Whatever the technology, u and v are roughly mirror images of each other: where one is increasing
the other is decreasing. A maximum of one thus occurs at types where the other is at a minimum,
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and at these types agents are perfectly matched. So a man, for example, of type t may be matched
to a type t woman but surrounded in T by men with higher payo¤s.
7.0.2 Implications for our understanding of matching and sorting
Sorting Perhaps most dramatically, the pattern of sorting - PAM, or NAM, or some mix of
the two - by itself tells us almost nothing about the underlying technology or preferences that
embody homophily. When more is better, PAM implies complementarity of inputs and NAM
implies substitutability. But with like attracts like, a positive correlation between partners
characteristics could be the result of similar type distributions, or of concavity of the output
function g: Any positive correlations that we actually observe may thus be the result of more is
better plus complementarity of inputs, or like attracts like plus concavity of g; or like attracts like
plus similar type distributions.
Interpreting wage and prot data Similarly, in looking at matches of employment, data
on wages and prots must be interpreted in a di¤erent way. If x and y are measures of a
workers skill type and a rms technology type respectively, then an observation of workers with
higher wage u employed by rms with higher prot v is consistent with more is better plus
complementarity of skills and technology, but also with like attracts like plus convexity of g.
Similarly, if high wage workers are employed by low prot rms, this may be evidence of more
is better plus substitutability, or like attracts like plus concavity of g: Of course, one way to
distinguish between like attracts like and more is better is to look directly at u and v as functions
of x and y, if the data is available. If more is better, they are both increasing; if like attracts
like, either they both have increasing and decreasing sections or one is increasing and the other
decreasing.
Who is unmatched? The analysis of Section 6 embeds the marriage market in a wider econ-
omy in which agents have outside options. It is the types where u or v is at a minimum in the
absence of a binding outside option that tell us which agents will be single when the option starts
to bind. In contrast to the case where more is better, having a type close to the mean type on
the other side does not always imply a high payo¤, and such agents may well remain single. To
continue with the example of employment based on skill and technology types, if there is a wide
range of technologies (the density  has a high spread) and a narrower range of skilled workers (
has a lower spread), but  and  have the same mean (as for example in Fig 5), then u has a U
shape and v an inverted U shape. If workers have a good enough outside option (a high u) then
it is those in the middle of the distribution of x who will not be employed (at least, in the market
under consideration), and it is the rms at the extremes of the distribution of y who will fall back
on their outside option v. If we apply this line of reasoning to personal relationships, so x and y
are male and female types, and we characterise as popular those men with types at or near the
mean of  and those women with types at or near the mean of , then if  has the same mean as
 but a lower spread, it is the unpopular women (at the extremes of ) who remain single, but
the popular men . This may seem paradoxical, but a marriage market with transferable utility is
39
brutal in attaching a low value to types in high supply, and there is no point in being a good or
even perfect match for some women if many other men are too; far better to have a niche type
and to be on the short side of the market.
Perfect matches and marital tensions Homophilic preferences naturally draw similar types
together, so it is hardly surprising that we are able to provide an explanation of why married
couples have similar political or religious views. But this masks a certain tension within rela-
tionships. Suppose T is a space of political views and a higher type means less liberal/more
conservative, and consider a couple for whom x < y; then if it were possible for types to change
(and this takes us well beyond the model) the man would want the woman to be more liberal, and
she would want him to be more conservative. Unless  =  , almost all couples will experience
such disagreements. In the model these tensions are resolved by an equilibrium in which agents
accept that everyone has a price and it is not worth paying for a more compatible partner. How-
ever, that a couple are perfectly matched (x = y) does not necessarily imply complete marital
harmony: either u or v is at a local minimum, so one spouse has accepted that it is worth giving
up a lot of utility for his or her ideal partner. Just because a couple are well matched does not
mean that both are happy.
8 Appendix A: Proofs





t (t)dt =  (s) only at a nite number of points s 2 T; which uniquely dene
the partition (t; s1; :::; sm 1; t):
(ii) If     changes sign over an interval Si = [si 1; si] then (s)   (s) for some s 2 S; in
contradiction to (i).
(iii) Suppose T1 = [t; t1] is a -interval; then since
R s1
t [(t)   (t)]dts = 0; we must have
t1 < s1; thus s1 2 Ti for some i > 1: If si 2 Tj and sk 2 Tl where i < k. then j < l; i.e.
two elements of the partition (t; s1; :::; sm 1; t) cannot be in the same interval of the partition
(t; t1; :::; tn 1; t): Thus m < n: A similar argument applies, mutatis mutandis, if T1 is a -interval.
Proof of Proposition 1 (i) If not then for some x; u(x) > Limt!x+ u(t), in which case for
x0   x positive but su¢ ciently small, all women would prefer a man of type x0 to a man of type
x: In equilibrium, some women must want to match with type x men.
(ii) Suppose that u is increasing and v is non-decreasing at t. No woman of type less than
t would choose a man of type t (it is better to choose a male type that is both closer and
cheaper), so a type t mans partner must be a type y woman where y  t: If y = t; then
u(t) + v(y) = f(t; y) = g(0), as the couple are perfectly matched; and if v is not decreasing at t;
then u(t  ") + v(y   ") < g(0) for " su¢ ciently small but nite and positive, in contradiction to
equation (7). Thus we take y > t: In equlibrium the man of type t chooses to match with a woman
of type y out of a choice set that includes women of type t;implying that v(y) < v(t): Consider now
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the type of the partner of type t female. She would not be chosen by a man of type less than t (it
is better to choose a female type that is closer and no more expensive) so a type t womans partner
must be a type x man, where (by the same argument as above) x > t; since she could have chosen
a type t partner, u(x) < u(t). If t < x  y, then u(x) + v(y) < u(t) + v(y) = f(t; y) < f(x; y); if
t < y  x; then u(x)+v(y) < u(x)+v(t) = f(x; t) < f(x; y): In both cases, u(x)+v(y) < f(x; y),
which contradicts (7). Thus, if u is increasing at t then v is decreasing at t. A similar argument
shows that if u is decreasing at t then v is increasing at t:
(iii) This follows directly from Assumption 1 and the rst order conditions associated with
(9) and (10).
Proof of Proposition 2 This follows directly from the argument in the main text, particularly
Jensens inequality applied to convex functions.
Proof of Proposition 3 We employ a slight variation on the argument used to establish
Proposition 2. Suppose Ti = [ti 1; ti] and Ti+1 = [ti; ti+1] are  and   intervals respectively.
Consider a man of type ti " 2 Ti matched with a woman of type y =2 Ti+1, and a woman of type
ti + "
0 2 Ti+1 matched with a man of type x =2 Ti:Then for " and "0 both positive and su¢ ciently
small this foursome could repartner and increase total output. That is to say
g("+ "0) + g(jx  yj) > g(jti + "0   xj) + g(ti   "  yj) (29)
which follows from (15) and the continuity of g:
Proof of Proposition 4 Suppose x1; x2 and x3; are all male types in the  interval Ti; where
x1 < x2 < x3, with imperfect matches of y1; y2 and y3 respectively. Then if y1 and y3 are in the
same  interval Tj , (so y1 > y3) then y2 is also in Tj (and hence y1 > y2 > y3): Assume intially
that i < j; if y2 < x1;then we have a Category B combination; if y2 > x1, and either y2 < y3
or y2 > y1 we have a Category A combination. This means that the subset of female types in Tj
matched by the submatching ij is convex i.e. an interval; similarly the subset of male types in
Ti matched by ij is an interval. A virtually identical argument works if j < i:
Proof of Proposition 5 This follows directly from the argument in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 6 If we vary one boundary, say z1; then to preserve the gender balance
of the four submatchings, we must vary the other three. More precisely, if z1 changes by an
innitesimal amount dzi then
(z1)dz1 =  (z2)dz2 = (z3)dz3 =  (z4)dz4
To determine the e¤ect of this change on Q, note rst that the submatching 14 gains a mass
(z1)dz1 of men of type z1 and the same gain in the mass of women of type z4; since (z1)dz1 =
 (z4)dz4 and z4 has decreased; the result is an increase in output of f(z1; z4)(z1)dz1: Similarly
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output from 12 decreases by f(z1; z2)(z1)dz1, output from 23 increases by f(z3; z2)(z1)dz1;
and output from 34 decreases by f(z3; z4)(z1)dz1: Thus
dQ = ff(z1; z4)  f(z1; z2) + f(z3; z2)  f(z3; z4)g(z1)dz1 (30)
In an equilibrium in which all four submatchings are of positive measure, (z1) > 0 and dQ = 0;
hence f(z1; z4) + f(z3; z2) = f(z1; z2) + f(z3; z4):
Proof of Proposition 7 Compare the partition (t; t1; :::; tn 1; t)  the points at which  = 
and giving the boundaries of the intervals Ti  with the partition (t; s1; :::; sm 1; t)   the points
at which  =  : Clearly, it is not possible for an interval Ti to contain more than one point from
(t; s1; :::; sm 1; t); if m = n  1; we therefore have t 2 T1; s1 2 T2; :::; si 1 2 Ti; :::; sm 1 2 Tm; t 2
Tm+1 = Tn: Suppose Ti = [ti 1; ti] is a  interval; it contains si 1 and the watershed xi : If xi <
si 1; then there is positive mass,
R si 1
xi
(t)dt; of men with types strictly inbetween xi and si 1;
who under convexity must match with women with types greater than ti: As (si 1) =  (si 1);
there is the same mass of men as women with types greater than si 1, so if xi < si 1; there
must be a positive mass of men with types greater than si 1 who match with women with types
less than si 1: This creates a Category A ine¢ ciency, and cannot occur in equlibrium. A similar
argument applies if xi < si 1; so x

i = si 1; and the same argument applies. mutatis mutandis,
if Ti is a  interval, in which case yi = si 1:
Proof of Proposition 8 To see that if m = n   1; then in the convex case there are no
non-adjacent NAM submatchings, suppose T1 is a  interval. Then all imperfectly matched
women with types in the interval [t1; y2]  T2 are matched with men with types in T1: But





(t)dt: This implies that all agents with types no greater than s1 are either
perfectly matched or matched by the adjacent NAM submatching 12: This argument can be
repeated for the remainder of the population; e.g. those agents with types greater than s1 and
no greater than s2 are either perfectly matched or matched by the adjacent NAM submatching
23:
To complete the proof, note that if there are no adjacent NAM submatchings then - almost
by denition - m = n  1:
9 Appendix B: Horizontal stratication and payo¤s when g is
convex.
This Appendix shows in the case where g is convex how matched agents form into self-contained
subpopulations or strata.
Suppose a NAM sub-matching ij has positive measure; we dene the interval Rij = [r ij ; r
+
ij ],
where r ij and r
+
ij are the lowest and highest types respectively matched by ij :
26 Rij gives the
26And because of NAM, ij matches r
 
ij types with r
+
ij types.42
span of ij . Then all agents with types in Rij match with partners who also have types in Rij .
For those agents actually matched by ij , this is true by denition; if they are not matched by
ij (so ij is not an adjacent matching) and only one agent in a matched couple has a type in
Rij then we have either a Category A or a Category B ine¢ ciency.
Hence Rij denes a self-contained subpopulation: all agents with types in Rij match with
other agents with types in Rij : Some will be perfectly matched; others imperfectly, but with
a di¤erence in partnerstypes bounded above by r+ij   r ij : Each NAM submatching of positive
measure is associated with a particular self-contained subpopulation, with its own bound on the
imperfection of matches. We can thus think of the population as horizontally stratied, each
span or stratum comprised of agents matching only among themselves.
An agent may belong to more than one stratum. If so, then one stratum is a subset of
another; i.e. two strata cannot overlap - otherwise we have a Category B ine¢ ciency.27 If ij and
kl are both of positive measure and Rij  Rkl then we say Rij is contained in Rkl and ij is
encompassed by kl. We now show how sets of strata, are connected in a hierarchical or tree-like
structure. This structure has important consequences for our understanding of the mix of PAM
and NAM, and of the payo¤ functions u and v.
Firstly, we describe an interative process for generating sets of strata.
1. We begin with the n   1 intervals giving the span of adjacent submatchings, forming the
sequence 1 = (R12; R23; :::; Rn 1;n). We can think of 1 as a partial stratication of the
population, covering agents with types in C1 = [Rij21Rij : Note that C1 itself is typically
not an interval.
2. We form the sequence 2 from 1 as follows: for any Rij 2 1; if ij is encompassed by
kl; and kl encompasses only submatchings in 1; then we replace Rij with Rkl, giving
an interim sequence 02; with as many elements as 1; if Rkl appears in 02 more than
once (because kl encompasses more than one adjacent submatching), we delete from 02
the second and later appearances of Rkl to form 2: 2 covers agents with types in C2 =
[Rij22Rij :
3. We continue in this way, forming h+1 from h. For any Rij 2 h; if ij is encompassed
by kl; and kl encompasses only submatchings in [h0hh0 , then we replace Rij with Rkl,
giving an interim sequence 0h+1; if Rkl appears in 
0
h+1 more than once, we delete from
0h+1 the second and later appearances of Rkl to form h+1: At stage h; h covers types in
Ch = [Rij2hRij :
4. If after some stage H no further encompassing of any submatchings is possible, the process
stops.
In discussing the properties of this process, the following denitions are useful:
27 If we take two intervals Rij = [ri; rj ]and Rkl = [rk; rl] then ij matches ri types with rj types, and kl matches
rk types with rl types, so if either ri < rk < rj < rl or rk < ri < rl < rj we have a category B ine¢ ciency, leaving
as possibilities either ri < rk < rl < rj or rk < ri < rj < rl; i.e. Rkl  Rij or Rij  Rkl:
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Denition 1 Let hij be the earliest stage at which Rij appears in a sequence:
Let Aij be the union of all the elements of hij 1 that are contained in Rij ; we call these the
substrata of Rij:
Let Mij and Wij be the set of male and female types respectively matched by ij :
For example, let n = 13; then we have 12 adjacent submatchings 12; 23; :::; 12;13: Suppose
that in addition in equilibrium 1;12; 25, 5;12 and 7;10 are each of positive measure (it is simple
to verify this creates no Category A or B ine¢ ciencies). Then the process described above works
as follows:
1. 1 = (R12; R23; :::; R12;13).
2. 25 encompasses 23; 34 and 45; and 7;10 encompasses 78; 89 and 9;10; so 2 = (R12; R25;
R56; R67; R7;10; R10;11; R11;12; R12;13).
3. 5;12 encompasses 56; 67; 7;10; 10;11 and 11;12; so 3 = (R12; R25; R5;12; R12;13): Although
1;12 encompasses submatchings whose spans are in 1 or 2;it also encompasses 5;12; and
R5;12 is not in 1 or 2; thus R1;12 =2 3:
4. 1;12 encompasses 12; 25 and 5;12; so 4 = (R1;12; R12;13):
5. No further encompassing of any submatchings is possible; so H = 4:
More generally, the process described in steps 1 to 4 above has the following properties:
(i) Aij is the union of an odd number of elements of hij 1 and is an interval.
(ii) The process stops after a nite number H of stages.
(iii) Successive sequences have fewer elements: #(h+1) < #(h):
(iv) Successive sequences cover more and eventually all types: Ch  Ch+1; with CH = T:
(v) For every submatching ij of positive weight, Rij 2 h for some h:
(vi) If Rij is the rst element in h, then i = 1; if it is the last element, then j = n; if Rij
is the immediate predecessor of Rkl in the sequence h; then j = k:
(vii) Rij = Mij [Aij [Wij :
It follows that although there is negative sorting within submatchings, there is a nevertheless
a broader pattern of positive sorting: a given sequence h is an ordered set of self-contained strata,
so there is PAM beween them. As h increases, more types are included, and eventually all types -
property (iv) - but this is less informative, as the PAM is occurring at a higher level of aggregation
- property (iii).
Additionally, since these NAM submatchings refer to that part of the overall population
where like is not matched exactly with like, the perfect matching arising from the overlap of the
two type densities is a further source of PAM. Although non-supermodularity of f prevents full
PAM of the whole population, there is still a tendency towards matching of like with like: in
some cases exactly so, in others with small di¤erences in type, and in yet others where the match
may be far from perfect.
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Equilibrium and the optimality of the NAM/PAM mix We now use the fact that in
equlibrium the overall matching maximises aggregate output. Consider the internal structure of
a typical stratum Rij in a sequence h: Rij consists of the interval Aij (the union of substrata
of Rij), enclosed by Mij and Wij (the agent types matched by ij), men on one side of Aij and
women on the other. What characterises the boundaries between Mij , Aij and Wij ; and those
within Aij between the substrata of Rij?
To answer this, we adopt some simplifying notation. Suppose Rij has p substrata; p is odd.
We write Aij = [z1; zp+1] and the substrata as [z1; z2]; [z2; z3]; :::; [zp; zp+1]: We assume, without
loss of generality, that Ti is a  interval and Tj is a  interval, so that Mij = [r ij ; z1] and
Wij = [zp+1; r
+
ij ]. Then z1 is the point at which men switch from ij to the submatching with
span [z1; z2]; zk is the point at which agents switch between the submatching with span [zk 1; zk]
and that with span [zk; zk+1];and zp+1 is the point at which women switch from the submatching
with span [zp; zp+1] to ij . The p substrata are all of positive length, so the points z1; :::; zp+1 are
distinct.
Let Qij denote the output produced by the self-contained subpopulation with types in Rij .
In equilibrium, Qij cannot be increased by any reassignment of partners with that subpopu-
lation; i.e. the switchpoints z1; :::; zp+1 maximise Qij : We now consider the implication of an
out-of-equilibrium variation in the switchpoints from their equilibrium values, keeping r ij and
r+ij constant and also the switchpoints (if any) within each of the substrata of Rij (i.e. we are
analysing a variation that is feasible but suboptimal). Then the values of the changed switch-
points are connected by the need to ensure that for ij ; and for each of the submatchings whose
spans are substrata of Rij ; the mass of men matches equals that of women. If z1 increases, more
men are matched by ij ; implying a decrease in zp+1 to enlarge the set of female types [zp+1; r+ij ]:
But it also implies that fewer men are matched by the submatching with span [z1; z2]; with no
change in the internal boundaries of that substratum, this can only be accommodated by a de-
crease in z2: This is turn implies an increase in z3; a decrease in z4; and so on; eventually (as p
is odd) we arrive at the decrease in zp+1:
More precisely, if zi changes by an innitesimal amount dzi then
(z1)dz1 =  (z2)dz2 = (z3)dz3 = :::: = (zp)dzp =  (zp+1)dzp+1 (31)
To determine the e¤ect on Qij , note rst that the submatching ij has gained a mass (z1)dz1
of men of type z1 and the same gain in the mass of women of type zp+1; since (z1)dz1 =
 (zp+1)dzp+1 and zp+1 has decreased; the result is an increase in output of f(z1; zp+1)(z1)dz1:
The submatching with span [z1; z2] has lost the same mass, but of men of type z1 and of women
of type z2, so that output decreases by f(z1; z2)(z1)dz1; similarly, the submatching with span
[z2; z3] has gained men and women of types z3 and z2 respectively, so that output increases by
f(z3; z2)





(z1) = f(z1; zp+1)  f(z1; z2) + f(z3; z2)  f(z3; z4) + f(z5; z4):::+ f(zp; zp 1)  f(zp; zp+1) (33)
Thus Qij is maximised at a value of z1 such that (z1)(z1) = 0: Since z1 is the point at which
men switch from ij to the submatching with span [z1; z2]; then in an equilibrium where these
both submatchings have positive measure, z1 2 int(Ti) and so, by Assumption 2, (z1) > 0:
Thus, in equilibrium, (z1) = 0; 28 this implies
f(z1; zp+1) + f(z3; z2) + f(z5; z4):::+ f(zp; zp 1) = f(z1; z2) + f(z3; z4) + f(z5; z6):::+ f(zp; zp+1)
(34)
(34) has a clear interpretation. Take a nite population with men of types z1; z3; :::; zp and
women of types z2;z4; :::; zp+1;where zk < zk+1: On the left side of (34), we have total output
under partial NAM, whereby the shortest man (with type z1) is matched with the tallest woman
(with type zp+1), with PAM amongst the remaining types; the right side gives output under
complete PAM. The function (z1) gives the excess of partial NAM over PAM, and (34) says
that in equilibrium the internal structure of the stratum Rij can be described by switchpoints at
which complete PAM is just balanced by an element of NAM. Given the diminishing marginal
loss of output as the type di¤erence between matched agents increases, it is the shortest man and
the tallest woman who pair up under partial NAM, with PAM preserved among the remaining
agents.
Note that the condition (z1) = 0 does not contain r ij or r
+
ij , the endpoints of Rij : This






(t)dt > 0 (so ij matches as many men as women),
changes in r ij and r
+
ij have no e¤ect on the optimal boundaries of the substrata of Rij :
constructing u and v We now use the analysis of stratiction to construct continuous equilib-
rium payo¤ functions u and v: The process follows that used to construct the strata themselves.
1. We start with the n  1 adjacent NAM submatchings, and payo¤ functions as given in vvv.
Their spans are the elements of 1:
2. UnlessH = 1, some elements of 1 are contained by elements of 2: Suppose ij encompasses
p adjacent submatchings; then Rij is in 2 and has p substrata, the union of which forms the
interval Aij . For notational simplicity we label these substrata [z1; z2]; [z2; z3]; :::; [zp; zp+1];
and we assume without loss of generality that ij matches shorter men with taller women,
so thatMij = [r ij ; z1] and Wij = [zp+1; r
+
ij ].
29 We join together, or concatenate, the p mens
payo¤ functions of these adjacent submatchings, and the p womens payo¤ functions, to
form buij and bvij ; both with domain Aij :We can ensure that buij is continuous by using up
28Although Qij is not necessarily a concave function of z1, it is straightforward to show that (z1) is decreasing
in z1; so there can be at most one point at which (z1) = 0.
29 If ij matches shorter women with taller men, in what follows we can swap women and men, and u and v; and
arrive at the same conclusion.
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p  1 of the degrees of freedom referred to above; by construction buij + bvij = g(0); so bvij is
also continuous.
3. We now concatenate buij and bvij with uij and vij respectively to form uij and vij both with
domain Rij = Mij [Aij [Wij . Thus
uij(x) =
8><>:
uij(x) for x 2Mijbuij(x) for x 2 Aij
uij(x) for x 2Wij
vij(y) =
8><>:
vij(y) for y 2Mijbvij(y) for y 2 Aij
vij(y) for y 2Wij
Note that this implies uij(t) + v

ij(t) = g(0) for all t 2 Rij :
4. For given functions uij and vij we ensure the continuity of uij (and hence of v

ij) at z1 and
zp+1 in two ways. Firstly, we can use the one remaining degree of freedom regarding buij to
set buij(z1) = uij(z1):
5. The argument for continuity at zp+1 is more involved. Over the interval Aij , buij changes
by buij(zp+1)   buij(z1). We now derive an expression for this change. Consider the NAM
submatching encompassed by ij with span [zk 1; zk]; and suppose that k is even, so shorter
men are matched with taller women; then if a man of type zk 1 is matched with a woman
of type zk they share the resulting output so that buij (zk 1) +bvij (zk) = f(zk 1; zk): But by
construction buij (zk) + bvij (zk) = g(0); thus
buij (zk)  buij (zk 1) = g(0)  f(zk 1; zk) if k is even
Similarly, if k is odd, the submatching with span [zk 1; zk] matches shorter women with
taller men so zk; bvij (zk 1) + buij (zk) = f(zk 1; zk): As buij (zk 1) + bvij (zk 1) = g(0) we now
have buij (zk)  buij (zk 1) = f(zk 1; zk)  g(0) if k is odd
Repeating this for all spans [z1; z2]; [z2; z3]; :::; [zp; zp+1]; and recalling that p is odd, we have
buij(zp+1) buij(z1) = g(0) f(z1; z2)+f(z3; z2) f(z3; z4)+f(z5; z4)::::::+f(zp 1; zp) f(zp; zp+1)
ij itself matches men with types in [r ij ; z1] with women with types in [zp+1; r
+
ij ]; with payo¤s
given by uij and vij : Thus uij (z1) + vij (zp+1) = f(z1; zp+1): But uij (zp+1) + vij (zp+1) =
g(0); so
uij (zp+1)  uij (z1) = g(0)  f(z1; zp+1)
Given uij (z1) = buij(z1); continuity of uij at zp+1 now requires that buij(zp+1)   buij(z1) =
uij (zp+1)  uij (z1) ; i.e. that
g(0) f(z1; z2)+f(z3; z2) f(z3; z4)+f(z5; z4):::+f(zp 1; zp) f(zp; zp+1) = g(0) f(z1; zp+1)
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But this is just the optimality condition (z1) = 0: Thus buij(zp+1) = uij (zp+1), so uij is
continuous at zp+1:
There is still one degree of freedom arising from the functions uij and vij ;so if uij were to
be adjusted up and vij down by a constant c; we would also adjust uij up and v

ij down by
c; maintaining continuity of uij and v

ij . The end result is that for every Rij in 2; we have
functions uij and v

ij ; each pair having one degree of freedom, which is then carried into the
next stage.
6. Essentially the same process can then be repeated for 3; 4;:::; H ;giving functions uij and
vij for every Rij (if Rij 2 1 then ij is an adjacent submatching and uij and vij equal uij
and vij). Thus at stage hij (the rst stage that Rij appears in a sequence of strata); we
form buij and bvij y concatenating pairs of utility functions whose domains are the substrata
of Rij (the elements of hij 1 that are contained in Rij): Each of these pairs has one degree
of freedom. so by using all but one we can ensure continuity of the functions buij and bvij
over the domain Aij : We then join uij and vij with buij and bvij to form uij and vij with
domainMij [Aij [Wij , the remaining degree of freedom being used to ensure continuity at
one end of Aij . Continuity at the other end follows from (34), (z1) = 0, which embodies
the condition that the internal boundaries of Rij (i.e. those between Mij and Aij , between
Aij and Wij); and between the substrata of Rij ; are optimal.
7. The end result is that for each sequence h; whose elements are intervals of T; we have a
sequence of pairs of continuous payo¤ functions, whose domains are the same intervals. As
h increases, these intervals cover more and more; and eventually all, of T: At the last stage,
H; we can concatenate the elements (if there are more than one) of the nal sequence to
arrive at the equilibrium payo¤ functions u and v, with one degree of freedom left.
Note that these steps are not to be interpreted as a constructive proof of the existence
of equilibrium payo¤ functions u and v; but follow from the duality results of Kantorovic and
Galichon and the nature of the equilibrium described in Propositions 2 and 5. Having deduced the
key properties of the equlibrium matching pattern - maximum possible matching of like with like,
with the remainder of the population in a hierarchical structure of NAM submatchings - then
if u and v are to sustain that equilibrium, they must satisfy the constructive process described
above.
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